CURRENT PRACTICES AND PROBLEMS IN
COMBATTING ILLEGALITY IN THE ART MARKET
In the past two decades, the art market has experienced an
astounding growth. The high cost of art collecting has surprised even
seasoned veterans of the market, some of whom have been caught off
guard by the scurry of investors seeking relief from the harsh effects of
inflation. In New York alone, commercial galleries report the volume
of art sales "at upwards of $500 million a year." ' The result of all of
this investment activity presents a textbook study of the classic economic forces of supply and demand. Specifically, the increasing dehas sky-rocketed
mand for a necessarily limited supply of quality art
2
level.
pre-1950
the
times
hundred
prices up to two
The high cost of acquiring the work of a major artist is illustrated
by the six million dollars which a Texas museum recently paid for a
relatively unknown portrait by Velzquez. 3 Curiously, as the supply
of Old Master and Impressionist works has become more severely
limited, there has emerged a market for formerly disfavored schools of
early nineteenth century European painting. The public avidity for
art collection is also evidenced by the increasing popularity of contemporary art,4 not to mention the booming market in art prints and
small collectible objects. 5
While art historians and critics may lament the capricious nature
of public taste, it is clear that public familiarity with an artist's
reputation builds demand for his work, and increased demand produces high prices. 6 More significantly, however, the limited supply
and high cost of art has also produced an increase in the number of art
frauds and thefts. This Comment will explore the problems and legal

1 N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1981, at C8, col. 1.

2 Bus. WEEx, July 21, 1980, at 208.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1981, at 1, col. 7. The Kimbell Art Museum in Fort Worth purchased
the portrait of Don Pedro de Barberana y Aparregui painted by the Spanish artist Velaiquez
about 1631-33.
4 N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1981, at C8, col. 1.
5 See THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CTr- OF NEW YORK CoMMrrEE ON ART LAW AND
LAWYERS FOR THE ARTS, CONFERENCE ON ARTS AND THE LAW (April 2, 1981). As noted
by one observer:
Almost anything painted, drawn, etched, lithographed, or engraved during the past
500 years has found a ready market.... Boring and murky 17th century canvases
by the most obscure artists, white-on-white minimalist oils, and mail order editions
of badly printed lithographs have all shared in the universal chase after some
tangible possession that will substitute for a rapidly devaluing currency.
Bus. WEEK, July 21, 1980, at 208
Bus. WmE, July 21, 1980, at 209.
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ramifications related to five areas of art law, including forgery, fraud,
theft, stolen antiquities, and marine antiquities. The second part of
this Comment will focus on the efficacy of the latest art legislation as
well as several proposals for legal and nonlegal solutions to illegality in
the art market.
FORGERY

Record sales in the art market in recent years have presented both
ingenious forgers and ordinary confidence men with plentiful opportunity for swindling the art buying public.7 It has been estimated
that transactions involving forgeries comprise up to ten percent of
total art sales. 8 The heavy influx of fakes on the art market may be
attributed to a combination of factors. First, art swindlers are attracted by the large profits that may be reaped from the sale of bogus
works of art. In the art world, the supply of authentic works remains
relatively constant thereby producing high prices in the face of increasing consumer demand. Art forgers simply take advantage of this
situation.9
At the same time, the risk of conviction for the sale of an art
forgery is comparatively small. At present, both state and federal laws
are inadequate to stem art transactions involving forgery. Significantly, art forgery is not a distinct statutory crime and prosecutions
generally fall within the purview of laws dealing with conspiracy, 0
7 Comment, Uniform Commercial Code Warranty Solutions to Art Fraud and Forgery, 14
WM. & MARY L. REv. 409 (1972). Annual sales in the art market have been estimated at $300 to
$400 million. Id. See also Hodes, "Fake" Art and the Law, 27 FEw. B.J. 73 (1967).
8 DuBoff, Controlling the Artful Con: Authentication and Regulation, 27 HASTINGs L.J.
973 (1976).
' Note, Legal Control of the Fabricationand Marketing of Fake Paintings, 24 STAN. L.
REv. 930, 936 (1972); see L. DuBosr, Airr LAw DoMIESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 477-78 (1978),
which states:
Historical perspective provides an insight into what conditions need be present
to induce the skilled artisan to emulate the general styles or specific works of the
great masters. During certain periods, notably the Roman era, the Renaissance, and
the industrial age to the present, the demand for fine works by renowned artists,
each of which is unique or limited in number, has far exceeded their availability.
The interest in acquisition by those who have accumulated wealth may arise from an
appreciation for and familiarity with art, or may merely reflect a desire for a type of
status or investment by the uncritical collector.
ld.
to See. e.g., United States v. Waldron, 590 F.2d 33 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 934
(1979), in which the defendant appealed from a conviction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 2314, 2315
(1976), for conspiring to transport property worth at least $5000 in interstate commerce knowing
that such goods had been stolen. The basis of the appellant's attack revolved around the fact that
although he and his cohorts planned to import stolen paintings from Canada and sell them in the
United States, "one painting actually delivered was not stolen but was a forgery worth far less
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General forgery statutes are designed to deal

with the fabrication of documents and commercial paper.12 Such a
haphazard approach is simply not conducive to the effective deterrence of art forgery. 13
Other reasons for the low rate of conviction include the jurisdictional problems created by the international movement of art as well
as the inordinate difficulty of carrying the burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt in a criminal case involving art forgery.' 4 The
shadowy origin and obscure chain of possession of a forgery often
preclude the establishment of each element of the substantive
crime.' 5 Proof of scienter is particularly problematic as a dealer can
easily claim that he was unaware that the object was a forgery at the
time of its sale. Likewise, the artist can claim unawareness that his

copy would be sold as the genuine article. 16 It is equally troublesome

to prove that the art object is a forgery. Expert opinion as to authenticity is expensive, difficult to obtain, and frequently contradictory. If
the object was produced outside of the country, any eyewitnesses to its
7
execution or transfer would be next to impossible to locate.'

than $5000." 590 F.2d at 33. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held "that a culpable
conspiracy may exist even though, because of the misapprehension of the conspirators as to
certain facts, the substantive crime which is the object of the conspiracy may be impossible to
commit." Id. at 34.
11 See generally Shientag, Some Legal Aspects of Art and Fake Art, 54 WOMEN LAW. J. 23,
25 (1968).
12 Note, supra note 9, at 940.
13 See, e.g., State v. Wright Hepburn Webster Gallery, Ltd., 64 Misc. 2d 423, 314 N.Y.S.2d
661 (Sup. Ct. 1970), aff'd, 37 A.D.2d 698, 323 N.Y.S.2d 389 (1971), in which the state attorney
general unsuccessfully employed a public nuisance theory when seeking an order to enjoin the
defendant gallery from showing and selling some 68 paintings produced and signed by master
forger David Stein and advertised by the gallery as "Forgeries by Stein." Id. Stein's career as a
forger is notable because of his ability to paint in the style of four great contemporary artists. All
told, Stein executed forty-one paintings to which he forged the signatures of Chagall, Miro,
Matisse, or Picasso and which he sold for a total variously estimated at $168,000 to 1 million
dollars. While serving a sentence in a French jail, Stein was permitted to ply his trade provided
that the resulting works bore the signature "Stein, D." A successful London sale of Stein
paintings led to the New York show for which the state attorney general sought an injunction.
DuBoff, supra note 8, at 975-76; see Disposition of Fake Art, 26 RECORD OF Assoc. oF BAR OF
Crry OF NEw YORK 591 (1971), reprinted in F. FELDMAN & S. WEIL, AmT WoRKs: LAW, POLICY,
PPAcricE 1079 (1974) [hereinafter cited as FELDMAN], which discusses the difficulty of applying a
public nuisance theory to the sale of art forgeries as the result of stretching the doctrine so as to
"embrace acts which concededly involve potential events in the future, rather than present acts
or conditions." Id. at 1084-85.
14 E.g., Shientag, supra note 11, at 25; Note, supra note 9, at 941.
Is Note, supra note 9, at 941.
16 Id. at 940.
17 Id. at 941.
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Compounding an already arduous situation is the fact that forgery victims are sometimes reluctant to cooperate in criminal prosecutions. Art dealers often prefer to remain silent rather than risk the loss
of customers.' 8 Defrauded purchasers fear public embarrassment at
having been made a dupe.' 9 The more pragmatic buyer, however,
forgoes enforcement of criminal sanctions to preserve the supposed
value of the forged object for resale or tax purposes. 20 Consequently,
private parties are not the only victims of art forgery. 2' The United
States Treasury suffers loss of tax revenue by virtue of deductible gifts
of improperly authenticated art to charitable institutions2 2 and the
23
duty free importation of ostensibly original works of art.
In cases of art forgery, the role of the attorney ordinarily commences at the time when the art buyer learns or suspects that the
purchased object is not the genuine product. Thus, it is essential that
the lawyer familiarize himself with the methods of forgery and their
detection.
A. Methods of Art Forgery
Technically, the legal definition of "forgery" is limited to the
falsification of a writing "of legal efficacy apparently capable of
effecting a fraud. ' 24 In art law, however, the term is normally construed according to its popular meaning. In the most basic sense, an
art forgery is a copy of a work of art made for fraudulent purposes,25

18 Id.

'Q Shientag,
20 See, e.g.,

supra note 11, at 25; Note, supra note 9, at 941.
Shientag, supra note 11, at 25; see Note, supra note 9, at 931.
21 Unscrupulous purchasers have also utilized art forgeries as the basis of fraudulent insurance claims. See G. SAVAGE, FoncEruEs, FAKES AND REPRODUCTIONS: A HANDBOOK FOR THE Ar
DEALER AND CoLLucroa 23 (1963).
22 E.g., Hodes, supra note 7, at 74; Note, supra note 9, at 931. Typical of the tax problems
faced by the philanthropic art collector is that of Dr. Joseph Sataloff who gave a silver candlestick, appraised at $130,000 by Sotheby Parke Bernet, to a Washington, D.C. museum in 1974.
The Internal Revenue Service disallowed a substantial portion of Sataloff's income tax deduction, claiming that the candlestick was worth only $18,000. An expert from Christie's appraised
the object at $3,000. Sataloff recently filed a suit against Sotheby Parke Bernet for six million
dollars in "lost tax benefits, interest, legal fees, punitive damages and emotional trauma."
Holubowich, Investing in Art: Some Traps for the Unwary, 67 A.B.A.J. 838-39 (1981).
23 See 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1976) (schedule 7, part 11). E.g., Hodes, supra note 3, at 74; Note,
.supranote 9, at 931.
24 BALLENnNE'S LAW DicnONARY 490 (3d ed. 1963).
25 G. SAVAGE, supra note 21, at 1. Savage states: "fakes are genuine works which have been
altered in character, or added to, for the purpose of enhancing the value; reproductions are
copies made for honest purposes which may subsequently be used by others for dishonest reasons;
replicas are contemporary reproductions." Id.
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and art forgeries are frequently classified according to the method of
26
fabrication.

Signatures are easily forged either by adding the name of a
famous artist to an unsigned work or by obfuscating an existing signature and replacing it with that of a master.2 7 It is also common for a
forger to complete an unfinished painting by an anonymous artist and
sell it as an original masterpiece of the same time period.2 8 Art

forgers sometimes take advantage of the historical tradition of training young artists in the workshop of an accomplished master.2 9 Be-

cause an apprentice frequently painted the background and unimportant details of a master's composition, it is often difficult to
distinguish the hand of one from the other. 3° The stylistic similarity
of teacher and student, therefore, presents the forger with a unique

2' Leonard DuBoff divides forgeries into three categories: "(1)Works deliberately created to
be sold as the product of another artist. . .(2) Exact replicas or other innocently-created pieces
which are sold as originals. . .(3) Works changed by the artist to enhance value or salability."
DuBoff, supra note 8, at 974-75.
2' See, e.g., M. FRIEDLANDER, ON ART AND CONNOISSEURSHIP 264 (1946): DuBoff. s-upra note
8, at 974-75; Shientag, supra note 11, at 24; Comment, supra note 8, at 410; Note, supra note 9,
at 932-33. DuBoff explains:
In appraising the value of a work of art, it is without question that the signature
affixed or the author designated by a noted expert carries an influence which is
inextricably interwoven with the merits of the work itself. Consequently, the discovery and disclosure that a once-accepted original is actually a copy or a forgery creates
confusion, both in terms of its market value and the appreciation this work engenders in the art community.
DuBoff, supra note 8, at 477. Another commentator noted:
Signatures are commonly forged and added, often inconspicuously, leaving the
buyer to find it for himself and rejoice in a discovery which seems to confirm the
attribution. It has been said that in nineteenth-century Paris specialists in signatures
were employed to do work of this kind. Fashions change, and it is sometimes found
that the signature of a once popular master has been added to the genuine work of an
artist who would, today, fetch a higher price. When Hobbema paintings were
inexpensive the signature of Ruysdael, whose work was in greater demand, was
sometimes substituted. Today, the chances are the Hobbema would realize the
higher price of the two.
G. SAVAGE, supra note 21, at 239.
2s See, e.g., G. SAVAGE, supra note 21, at 239; Comment, supra note 7, at 410; Note, supra
note 9, at 933.
29 See, e.g., G. SAVAGE, supra note 21, at 239.
30See M. FRIEDLANDER, supra note 27, at 250-57. Examples of collaboration by master and
apprentice in a single work may be illustrated by Andrea del Verrocchio's Baptism of Christ of
1470, located in the Uffizi Gallery in Florence, which reveals the hand of the young Leonardo da
Vinci in the execution of the left most kneeling angel. Some authorities have suggested that the
watercourses depicted in the foreground and background as well as the chiaroscuro effects that
characterize the body of Christ were painted by Leonardo. See S. FREEDBERG, PAINTING OF THE
HIGH RENAISSANCE IN ROME AND FLORENE 11-12 (1972); F. HAreT, HisToRY OF ITALIAN RENAISSANcE ART 276-77, 392-93 (N.D.).
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opportunity to convert a work authored by the apprentice into one
attributed to the master. 31
Another method of forgery consists of the reproduction of a
specific masterpiece with the intent of selling the copy as the original
work.3 2 A forger might also invent his own composition and merely
work in the style of the artist that he wishes to imitate.3 3 The process
known as pastiche refers to the selection and reconstitution of details
from an artist's oeuvre to invent a new composition.3 4 As it was
uncommon for artists to sign their work or achieve individual recognition in certain periods, it is possible for a forger to ascribe a group of
paintings to a previously unidentified master. 35 In addition, the popularity of sketching life studies initiated during the Renaissance provides the forger with an abundant supply of material from which to
fabricate drawings by renowned masters. 3 Finally, the credence of a
forgery produced by any of the aforementioned methods may be
supplemented by the production of false documents which ostensibly
37
establish the provenance of the art work in question.
Legal commentators and art scholars, alike, appear to disagree as
to whether certain types of alteration may be said to constitute forgery. In earlier centuries, it was considered acceptable to modify an

artist's work in order to accommodate the tastes or ideology3 8 of a
31See, e.g., DuBoff, supra note 8, at 974; Hodes, supra note 7, at 75; Note, supra note 9, at
933.
32 E.g., DuBoff, supra note 8, at 974; Hodes, supra note 7, at 75; Shientag, supra note 11, at
24; Comment, supra note 7, at 410; Note, supra note 9, at 933; see, e.g., G. SAVAGE, supra note
21, at 223-24.
3 E.g., DuBoff, supra note 8, at 974; Hodes, supra note 7, at 75; Comment, supra note 7, at
410.
1 E.g., M. FIEDLANDER, supra note 27, at 258; Hodes, supra note 7, at 75; Shientag, supra
note 11, at 24; Note, supra note 10, at 934; Comment, supra note 8, at 410. For example, an
examination of Interior with Drinkers by the famous Dutch forger Van Meegeran reveals that
the painting is a pastiche inspired by Pieter de Hoogh's work entitled The Card Players which
dates to the mid-seventeenth century. C. SAVAGE, supra note 21, at 146.
3s E.g., Hodes, supra note 7, at 75.
'3 See, e.g., G. SAVAGE, supra note 21, at 240-41; Note, supra note 9, at 934.
37 See, e.g., DuBoff, supra note 8, at 974; Shientag, supra note 11, at 24; Comment, supra
note 7, at 410. One magazine article reported:
Last winter, no fewer than 23 forged paintings purporting to be by modern masters-including Kandinsky, Cezanne, Braque, Picasso, and Klee-were sold by a
former gallery owner to a reputable New York dealer. The pictures had everything:
documentation, mentions in old auction sales catalogues, labels on the back with the
names of galleries that had sold them in the past. In fact, the International Foundation for Art Research, a New York-based organization that authenticates paintings,
found that the forgeries were worse than crude. Some of them were photoreproductions, the kind that you buy in department stores. The purchaser, himself presumably an expert, bought the lot anyway.
BusINEss W=, July 21, 1980, at 210.
" See, e.g., G. SAVAGE, supra note 21, at 238-39; DuBoff, supra note 8, at 978-79.
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subsequent period. 39 Similarly, heavy-handed efforts at restoration
frequently detract from the quality and hence the value of an original
work. 40 When combined with fraudulent intent, such embellishment

transforms the borderline case into one of forgery. The practice of
fragmentation in which a single, large work is divided into a number
of smaller pieces provides yet another method of increasing the marketability of a work of art. 41 Aside from cheating the purchaser who
has paid a premium price for an art object that is not what it purports
to be, society suffers the loss of the artist's original conception.
While the foregoing discussion dealt mainly with the forgery of
paintings, many of the same methods are adaptable to other forms of
the visual arts. These other media present problems of their own. For
example, the current popularity of prints has made them an attractive
target for forgery. 42 The problem is exacerbated by deceptive sales
practices which exploit the public confusion over the characteristics of

"

See, e.g., G. SAVAGE, supra note 21, at 238-39; DuBoff, supra note 8, at 978-79. See
generally M. FRIEDLANDER, supra note 27, at 265. In describing the revelation, under ultraviolet
light, of restoration of large, undamaged segments of a seventeenth century landscape painted in
the manner of Claude Lorrain, one commentator observed:
Because it was not an infrequent situation for a restorer in the past to find a
painting already damaged, to cause damage to the painting himself, or to find
portions of a painting displeasing in subject or style either to himself or to his client,
he would naturally follow his impulse to add paint in as compensating a manner as
his aesthetic judgment dictated. This being a common practice, it is not too difficult
to visualize the restorer, in consort with his client who may have been a collector or a
dealer, going one step further and making changes with the intent of actually
deceiving. Having realized his success in being able to repaint the damaged areas so
that they were not obvious, why not enhance the painting further with another
signature?
Olin, Examination in the Authentication of Oil Paintings539, 540-43, in ARr LAW DoMESTIc
AND INTERNATIONAL (L. DuBoff ed. 1975). Significantly, modern restoration techniques demonstrate a preference for a limited amount of repainting that is confined to the actual area of
damage. Id. at 543.
40 E.g., DuBoff, supra note 8, at 979.
41Wall St. J., Aug. 10, 1981, at 21, col. 4, reported that over $100 million of prints are sold
in the U.S. each year.
42 THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW Yonx COMMITTEE ON ART LAW AND
VOLUNTEER LAWYERS FOR THE ARTS, CONFERENCE ON ARTS AND THE LAW, MEMORANDUM RE:

(April 2, 1981) [hereinafter cited
as PUBLIC HEARING MEMORANDUM]. The deceptive marketing of prints is facilitated by technological advances in print reproduction, "the lack of clearly disclosed relevant information, the
relatively modest price of multiples, the difficulty involved in detecting deception, and the
likelihood that detection will be delayed." Id. at 1, 3. As with other types of art fraud, "the
applicable commercial law is inadequate for the public's protection." Id. at 3.
The potential for confusion of the print buying public is illustrated by the so-called "Picasso
prints" produced "from master plates prepared by an artist working from photographs of Picasso
works owned by Marina Picasso, the artist's granddaughter.... Each print will bear the words,
written in pencil by Marina, 'Collection of Marina Picasso.' The contemplated prices are $800 to
$1,500 each." Wall St.J., Aug. 10, 1981, at 21, col. 4.
PuBLIc HEARING ON ABUSES IN THE SALE OF ART REPRODUCTION,
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multiples that are determinate of value. 43 An original print is one
produced by the artist from a master plate, sheet, or block of his own
design which has received the artist's final approval 4 The extent to

which a print satisfies these criteria determines its value. 45 The value
of a print is also affected by the number of impressions, its condition,
and the number and size of editions. 40 Print reproductions, on the
other hand, are the products of photo-mechanical processes which do
not require the supervision or even the knowledge of the artist.4 7 It
should come as no surprise that a print buyer may be easily tricked
into paying a premium price for a "signed" (genuine or forged) reproduction.
Opportunities for forgery in sculpture are chiefly associated with
the technique of casting whereby a figure is produced from a prototype modeled by the artist. 48 As with prints, the value of such a piece

frequently depends upon the number of casts and editions. An artist's
failure to sign and number his work facilitates surreptitious copying
by forgers, but even this precaution combined with control of the
49
edition is not an absolute guarantee of authenticity.

E.g., S.

41

HODES, WHAT EvERY AsrrIST AND COLLECTOR SHOULD KNOW ABOUT THE LAW

113

(1974).
44 Id.
45 Id.
'1

4

Id. at 113-14.

See Hodes, supra note 7, at 75.
4' E.g., id. at 76.
The process known as surmoulage, which refers to the casting of bronzes from finished bronzes,
is reponsible for much of the confusion in the sculpture market today. As stated by one observer:
Art is no longer only a source of moral instruction or inspiration, it is also an
investment and it is to those who regard art as a store of monetary value that replicas
are most destructive. While in their advertisements these copies are always clearly
represented as reproductions, frequently it is also implied that they will increase in
monetary value, just as if they were real works of art.
Trustman, Abuses in the Reproduction of Sculpture, Arr Nsws, Summer 1981, at 91. Realistically, however, bronze reproductions have value only for decorative purposes; that is "[u]nless
. ..they appear on the market as the real thing." Id. Interestingly, some commentators attribute
the popular demand for art objects to the sale of museum authorized reproductions. Such
"[c]ritics feel that a fine line separates greed from the legitimate desire to acquaint people with
great art, and there is no question that reproductions are appealing, even to the most knowledgeable people." Id.
I" Id. See United States v. Tobin, 576 F.2d 687 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1051
(1978), in which three defendants were convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2315 (1976) for conspiracy
to receive, conceal, and sell two statues worth over $5000 which had moved in interstate
commerce and which the defendants knew to be stolen. At trial, the government's art expert
unexpectedly testified that one of the statues, alleged to have been "an authentic casting of the
'Bronco Buster" by the noted American artist Frederic Remington," was "an excellent forgery
that could fool many laymen." 576 F.2d at 689, 691. The basis of the expert's opinion, quoted
below, is instructive as to methods employed to detect this type of forgery.
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The buyer of antiquities must also exercise a degree of caution
because the identification of ancient artists is often tenuous at best and
it is difficult to ascertain the chain of possession"0 where an object is
claimed to have been freshly dug from the ground. Similarly, the
purchaser should be suspicious in instances where a seller of ancient
art provides too detailed a representation regarding the origins of the
object to be sold. 5 ' The uncertainty of attribution combined with the
remarkably high value ascribed to even the humblest of ancient household items has produced a thriving marketplace in fake artifacts.
B. Methods of Detecting Art Forgery
There are essentially two approaches in the determination of the
authenticity of a work of art: connoisseurship and scientific analy-

sis. 52 The traditional method practiced by art historians is denoted by

the term "connoisseurship." "The aim of connoisseurship is to restore
works of art to their original positions-of time and place-in the
stream of creative production. It tackles questions of authenticity and
attribution, hence dating and provenance." ' 3 A well-trained con-

First, the foundry stamping is atypical. Second, the stamping identifying the statue
as casting No. 93 is too indistinct. Third, the base of the statue is about one-half inch
higher than it should be, and the statue is about seven-sixteenths of an inch too short.
Finally, the ears on the horse are misshaped. [The expert] explained that on an early
casting of the Bronco Buster such as No. 93 the horse's ears should be laid back flat
and quite small. In contrast, the horse's ears in the statue he examined are rather
large and stick outward. These characteristics are found only in castings of the
Bronco Buster numbered above 260.
Id. at 691. Despite the fact that the expert determined that the stolen statue was a forgery, he
appraised it at a value of $5,000 to $7,000 because of its quality. Id.
Remington attempted to control the reproduction of his work through foundry numbering
of individual casts. Nevertheless, the plethora of so-called Remington's on the market is indicative of the abuses that characterize the market in counterfeit sculpture. According to one scholar,
the problems of identifying genuine Remington casts are compounded by inaccuracies in numbering as disclosed by foundry records and by the posthumous authorization of castings at least
until the death of the artist's widow at which time the molds were supposedly broken. Trustman,
supra note 48, at 86. The uncertainty of attributions to Remington is further complicated by the
possibility of surreptitious castings made by foundry workers from the original molds. Id. Of
more dubious character, however, are surmoulaged works in the form of unidentified recasts or
on which the appropriate foundry marking and date has been effaced. Id. at 87. The simplicity
of disguising a surmoulage as an original bronze is illustrated by the large number of recasts
made from Remington's Bronco Buster with plain leather chaps that have been altered to
resemble Remington's rarer, woolly chapped version of the Bronco Buster in an attempt to hide
the lack of refined detail that necessarily characterizes a reproduction. Id.
50 See, e.g., Hodes, supra note 7, at 76.
51 Id.

u See, e.g., W. KLEINBAUER, MODRN PERSPECTIVES IN WEEn'N AR HIsToRy 37-38 (1971).
But see Comment, supra note 7, at 411.
53

W.

KLEINBAUER,

supra note 52, at 41.
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noisseur is well-versed in the history of the period in which he is a
specialist and possesses a mental catalogue of the art objects produced
within that time span. A good connoisseur has a long experience of
handling original works of art on a regular basis. s4
"Sound connoisseurs are not armchair wizards who go about
their business by examining photographs, but scholars who handle
and observe critically the actual work of art, either within or outside
its original environment." 5 5 The stylistic analysis of the connoisseur
may be confirmed through documentary research of the period in
question. For example, archival material provides an important
source of information regarding art objects produced after the late
Middle Ages. 6 Where the piece is of ancient origin, the art historian
must depend upon the evidence gleaned from coins, carvings in stone,
and surviving texts of the classical historians. The presence of a signature or date on a work of art must be regarded with caution due to the
potential for alteration. 57 Ultimately, the art expert is forced to rely
upon the evaluation of the visual elements of a work as compared with
similar works of the period.
Although the specific approach varies, an art historian will typically begin the process of authentication by comparing the questioned
piece with the accepted body of the artist's work.5 8 The composition
may provide a clue as a forgery sometimes lacks the organic unity of
an original work. 59 The appearance of anachronistic details in wardrobe, hairstyle, jewelry, architecture, or setting which postdate the
supposed year of execution also reveals a lack of authenticity. As a
general rule, the visual perceptions80 of both artist and forger are
products of their time. Inevitably, a forger's interpretation of the
imitated work is influenced by the current appreciation for particular
qualities of the master's style.6 1 Any undue emphasis of a specific

"'

Id.
I5
Id.

E.g., id. at 44.
57 Id. See, e.g.. Offner, Guido da Siena and A.D. 1221, GAz'rTE nEs BE~ux ARTs 61-90
(1950), reprinted in Kleinbauer, supra note 52, at 107-23, which exemplifies the methods of
connoisseurship. By utilizing his expertise and historical knowledge of the Italian Dugento,
Offner was able to conclude that the inscription of the date 1221 and the words "ME GUIDO
DE SENIS DIEBUS DEPINXIT AMENIS" on the Palazzo Pubblico Madonna in Siena were the
work of a restorer and that Guido could not have executed the panel before the last quarter of the
thirteenth century. Id.
" See W. KLEINBAUER, supra note 52, at 43.
59 See M. FrIum.ANDER, supra note 27, at 236; Shientag, supra note 11, at 27.
See e.g., M. Friedlander, supra note 27, at 259; Comment, supra note 7, at 412.
61 See Shientag, supra note 11, at 27. Max Friedlander stated it well in his volume On Art
and Connoisseurship:"Since every epoch acquires fresh eyes, Donatello in 1930 looks different
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aspect of the original product becomes increasingly apparent with the
evolution of contemporary tastes over a period of time. 2
Although stylistic analysis and documentary research by a qualified art historian is an effective means of authenticating a work of art,
it should be noted that few experts make their services available to the
public. 63 Museum directors are sometimes prohibited by their institutions from rendering opinions in order to avoid possible litigation in
the event of error, damage to reputation due to inappropriate endorsements, and conflict of interest problems.6 4 Similarly, professors
of art history are reluctant to authenticate an object in a private
collection, possibly due to a distaste for haggling over fees, disappointing hopeful owners, and the potential loss of credibility.8 5
Another approach utilized to determine the authenticity of a
work of art relies upon the results of scientific testing. This type of
analysis is particularly useful as a means of identifying the compositional elements of a painting, as exemplified by wood, canvas, and
pigments, as well as providing a reliable method of dating. 66 Frequently, a forgery is detected due to a deviation from the use of the
original materials and techniques.6 7 As one commentator noted, "A
forgery can be revealed if the stretcher is not made of a wood used in
the original artist's locale or if its age is not contemporaneous with the
date of the imitated work."' 68 A forgery can also be detected by

examining the type of canvas used and the method in which it was
woven. Craquelure, which denotes the network of cracks which develop in a painting due to shrinkage and movement between layers of
paint, is sometimes indicative of age.6 9 X-rays and similar tests 70 are

from what he did in 1870. That which is worthy of imitation appears different to each generation. Hence, whoever in 1870 successfully produced works 'by' Donatello, will find his performance no longer passing muster with the experts in 1930." M. FRIEDLANDER, supra note 27, at 26061.
61. It is apparent that the so-called "test of time" would not detect the forgery of a modem
work of art. See, e.g., G. SAVACE, supra note 21, at 224.
e' DuBoff, supra note 8, at 981.
Id. at 981-82. See generally CODE OF ETHICS OF ASSOCIATION OF AnT MusEuM DiRncrons,
reprinted in F. FELDMAN, supra note 13, at 1162-63.
65 An expert who denounces the authenticity of a work of art may find himself defending a
lawsuit for slander of title brought by its owner. See, e.g., Hahn v. Duveen, 133 Misc. 871, 234
N.Y.S. 185 (Sup. Ct. 1929).
" See, e.g., Stross, The Physical Sciences in the Study of Archaeological and Art Objects in
Arr LAW DOMEFC AND INTERNATIONAL 497 (L. DuBoff ed. 1975); DuBoff, supra note 8, at 993.
07 E.g., DuBoff, supra note 8, at 995; Comment, supra note 7, at 411. See generally G.
SAVAGE, supra note 21, at 204.
" Comment, supra note 7, at 411.
69 Id. As noted by Max Friedlander, however:

[t]here exist many genuine pictures which show no cracks, but these are never absent
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employed to examine layers of pigment and undercoatings which in
turn reveal the stages of artistic production as well as later alterations.
X-rays, however, require expert analysis because while underpainting
may be indicative of forgery, it may also indicate restoration, an
artist's dissatisfaction with his work, or a desire to economize by
reusing a discarded canvas. 7 ' The reconstruction of ancient manufacturing techniques through the production of samples via trial and
error testing and compositional comparison with genuine artifacts
provides another valuable method of detecting forgeries. 72 Another
type of comparative analysis7 3 permits the detection of a forged painting through the identification of its pigments. Records exist which
describe the composition of paints and their date of discovery. If a
certain pigment is known to have come into use at a particular time,
its presence in a painting purported to date to an earlier period is
74
evidence of forgery.
Although the foregoing discussion of the scientific methods used
to detect art forgeries is not exhaustive, 75 it is sufficient to suggest the
problems inherent in this form of authentication. Significantly, expert
interpretation of test results remains a necessity where artistic identity
is at issue. Moreover, the cost of scientific analysis renders it an

in false ones. The craquelurecaused by age differs more or less clearly from one
achieved artificially. The primitive method of making cracks by drawing or scratching with pencil or brush is held in contempt by the forgers of our days. It is
customary to resort to the trick of producing false cracks by a chemical action-say
by sudden heating which causes a coating and breaks up the colour surface latticefashion.
M. FmEDLANDER, supra note 27, at 263-64. See also C. SAVAGE, supra note 21, at 207-09.
70Ultraviolet light can also detect repainting provided the entire surface of the canvas has
not undergone alteration. Photomicrographs reveal tiny characteristics of a painter's brushstrokes although the latter have a tendency to change with the development of the artist's style.
More sophisticated than the x-ray is auto-radiography which produces a series of radiographs which "permits the identification of a number of the pigments used in a painting...
gives information on the manner in which they were originally put down by the artist, as well as
their distribution throughout the body of the painting." DuBoff, supra note 8, at 997.
71 Id. at 996.
7, Id. at 995.
7 Comparative analysis has also been used to study: lead isotope ratios in order to date
paintings; desert varnish formation as a means of authenticating Egyptian limestone sculptures;
and composition patterns of obsidian, clay, and quartzite artifacts in the discovery of ancient
trade routes. Id. at 994.
7' See, e.g., G. SAVACE, supra note 21, at 230-32; Comment, supra note 7, at 411; Note,
supra note 9, at 930. For example, Prussian blue and zinc white do not appear before the
eighteenth century. Id.
M Other methods include radiocarbon dating, thermoluminescent analysis, obsidian hydration, fission tracks, and x-ray diffraction. See generally DuBoff, supra note 8, at 988, 990, 992,
996.
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impractical method of determining the authenticity of less expensive
objects of art. The vagarious nature of art authentication thereby
supplies the prelude to the defraudation of the art-buying public by
unscrupulous dealers.
FRAUD

Bustling activity in the art market has presented more than one
avenue for illegal gain in the past several years. The effect of publicity, inflation, and other indeterminable factors has implanted in the
American consciousness the erroneous view that an investment in art
offers a better guarantee of substantial profit than the stock market. 70
This is particularly true in the print market which has benefitted from
the current popularity of artistic pursuits as well as from the notion
that "collectibles" have growth potential as investments. 77 Lack of
knowledge and a tendency to view works of art in terms of dollars and
cents have proven to be the bane of many an inexperienced buyer. 78
Aside from direct purchases from the artist, dealers and auction
houses are the primary source of art acquisitions today. According to
one commentator, disreputable art dealers are the major conduit of
forgeries and stolen works. 79 Frequently, however, the seller is simply careless in failing to ascertain as nearly as possible the authenticity
of a work sold as genuine. An examination of relevant case law
illustrates the necessity of careful investigation by both uninitiated
and experienced art lovers as a prelude to involvement in the art
market.
In Dawson v. G. Malina, Inc.,80 a federal district court in New
York set forth a reasonable basis in fact test as the standard applicable
to the evaluation of a seller's representations of authenticity to a
purchaser of works of art. The art collector in Dawson sued a dealer

E.g., Hodes, supra note 7, at 73.
' PUBLC HEARiNG MEMORANDUM, supra note 42, at 1.
78 Witness the emergence of investment funds that utilize slick advertising techniques which
guarantee significant financial appreciation of -art portfolios." While the potential for fraud is
obvious due to the intangible nature of art, problems of valuation, and dependence on the efforts
of promoters, current state and federal statutes do not specifically regulate such -'securities."
Similarly, art has been promoted as a tax shelter gimmick whereby the taxpayer purchases a
master lithographic plate, a limited edition of prints or the reproduction rights thereto in
exchange for cash and a note. Thus far, the reaction of the Internal Revenue Service has not been
favorable to investors. THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CrrY OF NEW YoRK CoMMirTTE ON
AnRr LAW AND VOLUNTEER LAwYERS FOR THE ARTS, CONFERENCE ON ARTS AND THE LAW (April 2,
1981). See generally FoRaEs, Nov. 24, 1980, at 185.
7" Note, supra note 9, at 934-35.
80 463 F. Supp. 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
78
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for rescission or damages for breach of warranty in connection with
the purchase of eleven objects of Chinese art. 8 ' After the items were
shipped to his home in Jersey, Channel Islands, the plaintiff began to
experience doubts as to the authenticity of a vase which the defendant
had attributed to the Sung dynasty and for which the plaintiff had
paid a purchase price of $35,000.82 When the defendant refused to
refund the purchase price, the plaintiff arranged for the appraisal of
the remaining objects. 83 Prior to trial,
the defendant accepted the
84
return of all but five of the pieces.
Citing the vagueness of expert opinion at trial as well as the lack
of precedent under New York statutes, the Uniform Commercial
Code, or common law fraud and misrepresentation, the district court
defined the standard of proof under the applicable statute 85 as being
whether the representations which Malina furnished Dawson "had a
reasonable basis in fact, at the time these representations were made,
with the question of whether there was such a reasonable basis in fact
being measured by the expert testimony provided at trial." 8 Whether
the defendant's representations "were without a reasonable basis in
fact at the time that these representations were made" must be estab'8 7
lished "by a fair preponderance of the evidence."
The court applied the "reasonable basis in fact test" to each of the
five disputed items. 8 Essentially, the analysis consisted of a compari-

'"

82

Id. at 463.
Id.

13 Id. at 464.
64 id.
"

N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 219-c (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1977) states:
Any provision in any other law to the contrary notwithstanding: 1. Whenever

an art merchant, in selling or exchanging a work of fine art, furnishes to a buyer of
such work who is not an art merchant, a written instrument which, in describing the
work, identifies it with any author or authorship, such description (i) shall be
presumed to be part of the basis of the bargain and (ii) shall create an express
warranty of the authenticity of such authorship as of the date of such sale or
exchange. Such warranty shall not be negated or limited because the seller in the
written instrument did not use formal words such as 'warrant' or 'guarantee or
because he did not have a specific intention or authorization to make a warranty or
because any statement relevant to authorship is, or purports to be, or is capable of
being merely the seller's opinion.
2. In construing the degree of authenticity of authorship warranted as aforesaid, due regard shall be given to the terminology used in describing such authorship
and the meaning accorded to such terminology by the customs and usage of the trade
at the time and in the locality where the sale or exchange took place.
Id.
8 463 F. Supp. at 467.
a' Id.
8 Id.
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son of the defendant's representation of each object with the expert
testimony regarding the certainty of each attribution. The court's
treatment of the aforementioned Sung dynasty vase is illustrative of
the test. Specifically, the final bill of sale promised an "[a]ntique
Chinese Chun Yao vase" from "the Samuel T. Peters collection"
which had been "exhibited at the New York Metropolitan Museum of
Art.

.

. in.

.

. 1916."1"

The weight of the expert testimony favored

a date later than the Sung dynasty with the defendant's experts qualifying the possibility of dating to the Sung period.90 Of greater significance to the court, however, was the defendant's failure to inquire
whether the vase was the one that had been exhibited at the Metropolitan Museum."' The defendant had based his representation regarding the provenance of the vase on its similarity to a photograph from
the 1916 exhibition catalogue.

2

Testimony at trial, however, estab-

lished conclusively that the vase in the catalogue was still in the
possession of the museum. 9 3 Based on this and similar evidence, the
court held that the plaintiff was entitled to rescind the purchase of
three of the Chinese art objects and to obtain a refund of the purchase
price 94 plus interest as calculated from the date of the transaction. 5
The related problem of dealer disclaimer under the common law
and the Uniform Commercial Code was addressed by the New York
supreme court in Weisz v. Parke-BernetGalleries, Inc.96 The issue in
Weisz involved whether two plaintiffs of differing experience were
chargeable with knowledge of the defendant's limitation of warranty
with respect to the authenticity of paintings purchased at auctions
conducted by the defendant Parke-Bernet. 97 The paintings were
listed in the auction catalogue as the work of Raoul Dufy along with
descriptive material, a photographic reproduction, and authenticating information in the form of a certificate and a notation regarding
the artist's signature.98 Inserted among the introductory pages of the

89 Id.

90

id. at 468.

91 Id.

Id.
Id.
91The plaintiff had purchased the three Chinese art objects for a price totalling $59,400. Id.
at 471. The purchase price of all eleven pieces amounted to $105,400. Id. at 463.
9s Id. at 471.
11 67 Misc. 2d 1077, 325 N.Y.S.2d 576 (City Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1971), rev'd. 77 Misc. 80, 351
N.Y.S.2d 911 (App. Div. 1974).
97 67 Misc. 2d at 1078, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 578.
98 Id. at 1080, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 579-80.
92

93
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catalogue was a page entitled "conditions of sale" which stated that all
sales were "as is," and that "neither the galleries nor its consignor
warrants or represents, and they shall in no event be responsible for,
the correctness of description, genuineness, authorship, provenience
or condition of the property." 9 At the outset of the auction, it was
the defendant's policy to announce that all transactions were subject
to the conditions of sale. 00
Several years after making the purchase, the plaintiffs learned
that the paintings were forgeries of negligible commercial value.
When Parke-Bernet refused to refund the purchase price,' 0' the buyers
sued for breach of express warranty. The issues before the trial court
were whether the plaintiffs knew or were legally chargeable with
knowledge of the disclaimer, and if so, whether the disclaimer was
effective under these circumstances to immunize the auction house
from liability for the misrepresentation. 10 2
The trial court concluded that plaintiff Weisz, who had never
bid at an auction before, was not aware of the conditions of sale. 0 3
Citing Williston, the court stated the applicable test as "whether 'the
person . . . should as a reasonable man understand that it contains

terms of the contract which he must read at his peril." 04 The court
explained that people are attracted to auctions because of an "interest
in owning works of art, not on the basis of their legal experience or
business sophistication."'' 0 5 Thus, it would be unreasonable to assume that a bidder would anticipate the presence of an unqualified
disclaimer in a catalogue devoted to the description of the articles to
be sold. 10 The court concluded that to have successfully bound Dr.
Weisz to the conditions of sale, the seller would have had to call
greater attention to the existence of those conditions.107
The court, however, found that unlike Dr. Weisz, plaintiffs, Mr.
and Mrs. Schwartz, had knowledge of the conditions of sale. 10 8 Nevertheless, the court emphasized the defendant's superior knowledge and

IrId. at 1079, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 579.
Ioo
ld. at 1080, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 578-79.

101 Dr. Weisz had paid $3,347.50 for his painting. Mr. and Mrs. Schwartz paid $9,360 for
their work of art. Id. at 1078, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 578.
10oId. at 1079, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 579.

101 Id.

at 1080, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
101Id., 32.5 N.Y.S.2d at 580 (quoting 1 S.
105Id. at 1081, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
Id.
107 Id.
"m

10'

Id., 325 N.Y.S.2d at 581.

WILLISTON, CONTRACTS

§ 90D (2d ed. 1937)).
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experience as well as its intention that bidders rely upon the accuracy
of the catalogue descriptions as an important determinant. 09 The
court noted that Parke-Bernet's reputation was "invested with an aura
of expertness and reliability." 0 The very fact that Parke-Bernet was
offering a work of art for sale would inspire confidence that it was
genuine and that the listed artist in fact was the creator of the
Consequently, such factors as the wording and arrangework." ''
ment of the catalogue as well as the technical language and subtle
manner of presenting the disclaimer "le[d] to the conclusion that
Parke-Bernet did not expect the bidders to take the disclaimer too
seriously or to be too concerned about it. . . . [T]he average reader of
this provision would view it as some kind of technicality." " 2 Thus, in
holding the disclaimer ineffective," 3 the court relied upon requirements of fair dealing where the contracting parties exhibit "a basic
4
inequality of knowledge, expertness or economic power.""
On appeal, the judgment was reversed." 5 According to the
appellate court, neither the applicable statutes nor the case law at the
time of the auction "recognized the expressed opinion or judgment of
the seller as giving rise to any implied warranty of authenticity of
authorship.""16 In addition, the court approved the catalogue description of the terms of sale as a clear disclaimer of express or implied
warranties of authenticity." 7 Noting the impossibility of achieving
absolute certainty with respect to the authenticity of a work of art, the
court concluded that the latter state of affairs is one element of a
purchaser's bid at auction. "[S]ince no element of a wilful intent to
deceive is remotely suggested in the circumstances here present the
purchasers assumed the risk that in judging the paintings as readily-

log
Id. at

1081-82, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 581.

110 Id. at 1082, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
"I Id.

112Id., 325 N.Y.S.2d at 582.
13 Similarly, the Weisz court invalidated a provision of the disclaimer which stated that "any
and all claims of a purchaser shall be deemed to be waived and shall be without validity unless
made in writing to the Galleries within ten days after the sale." The court found that the
provision was inapplicable to Dr. Weisz because he had no knowledge of the conditions of sale.
Likewise, the provision did not apply to Mr. and Mrs. Schwartz as a reasonable and fair
construction by the court limited it "to claims which were known or should have been known to
the buyer during the ten day period." Id. at 1083, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 582-83.
114 Id. at 1082, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 582.
11- Weisz v. Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc., 77 Misc. 80, 81, 351 N.Y.S.2d 911, 912 (App. Div.
1974).
116 Id. at 80, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
117 Id.
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identifiable, original works of the named artist, and sealing their bids
accordingly, they might be mistaken.""18 The dichotomous results
reached by the two courts may be explained by the fact that while
New York had adopted the Uniform Commercial Code by the time of
the trial, it had not done so on the dates of the litigated auctions." 19
Because the Uniform Sales Act did not contain a provision governing
disclaimers, the trial judge relied upon common law contract principles to reach a conclusion resembling that of a case brought under
section 2-316 of the Uniform Commercial Code.120 Because the majority of states have now enacted the Uniform Commercial Code, the
result reached by the trial court is of greater relevance to a determination of the legal ramifications of a dealer disclaimer today.
Heretofore, the problem of fraud has been addressed in the context of the victimization of the art-buying public. In In re the Estate of
Mark Rothko,' 2' the element of fraud emanated from a conflict of
interest on the part of fiduciaries of the artist's estate. In 1970, Mark
Rothko, a noted abstract expressionist painter, died testate leaving an
estate comprised mainly of 798 valuable paintings. 122 Through two
separate contracts, three executors disposed of the paintings within
approximately three weeks of Rothko's death. 23 Under the first
agreement, the executors agreed to sell Marlborough A.G. 100 paintings for a total of $1,800,000 to be paid with a $200,000 down
payment and twelve interest-free installments spread over a twelve
year period. 2 4 In the second contract, the executors consigned 700
paintings to Marlborough Gallery, Inc., permitting the latter to sell
up to thirty-five paintings a year for twelve years and receive a 50
25
percent commission.
Since the decedent's children, 28 Kate and Christopher Rothko,
were entitled to take an elective share in the estate, they instituted an
action in the surrogate's court "to remove the executors, to enjoin
[Marlborough A.G. and Marlborough Gallery, Inc.] from disposing of

its Id.

119DuBoff, supra note 8, at 1010.
120 Id.

12143 N.Y.2d 305, 372 N.E.2d 291, 401 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1977). See also Trucco, The Museum
Investigations:An Update, Airr NEws, Summer, 1981, at 120.
12243 N.Y.2d at 315, 372 N.E.2d at 293, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
I"

Id.

Id.
,1- Id. at 316, 372 N.E.2d at 293, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
2' The decedent's children were joined by the State Attorney-General "as the representative
124

of the ultimate beneficiaries of the Mark Rothko Foundation, Inc., a charitable corporation and
the residuary legatee under decedent's will." Id., 372 N.E.2d at 293, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 452.
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the paintings, 2 7 to rescind the aforesaid agreements between the executors and said corporations, for a return of the paintings still in
possession of those corporations, and for damages." 28 The surrogate
established that executor Bernard J. Reis was an officer of Marlborough Gallery, Inc., and that the gallery had formerly received only a
ten percent commission on the sale of Rothko's work by virtue of an
inter vivos contract with the artist. In addition, the surrogate found
that Reis was in a position of conflicting interests which he exploited
to Marlborough's benefit. 2 9 The surrogate further concluded that
the second executor, unsuccessful artist Theodoros Stamos, utilized his
position to gain the favor of Marlborough which subsequently rewarded him with a contract, and "that Stamos acted negligently and
improvidently in view of his own knowledge of the conflict of interest
of Reis." 3 0 According to the surrogate, the third executor, Morton
Levine, acted imprudently as a fiduciary when he followed the lead of
his co-executors without investigating the situation or securing independent appraisals when he was aware of Reis' conflict of interest, the
ulterior motives of Stamos, the control of the two Marlborough corporations by one Francis K. Lloyd, and the valuable nature of the
subject paintings.131 Accordingly, the improper conduct of the executors mandated their removal as fiduciaries. 32 In addition, the surrogate found that the two corporations and Lloyd were guilty of contempt in disposing of fifty-seven paintings in violation of an injunction, and that the two contracts negotiated by the executors "provided
inadequate value to the estate, amount to a lack of mutuality and
fairness," and should be set aside due to the disloyalty of the executors.
Furthermore, the inter vivos contracts with the artist would not be
revived because the conduct of the parties "evinced an intention to
33
abandon and abrogate these compacts."1
Damages for the paintings already sold were assessed against
Reis, Stamos, Lloyd, and both Marlborough corporations according to
the value of the paintings at the time of trial. 3 4 The surrogate also
imposed a civil fine of $3,332,000 against Lloyd and the corporations

"'

The Surrogate issued a preliminary injunction on September 26, 1972. Id., 372 N.E.2d at
293-94, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 452.
1- Id., 372 N.E.2d at 293, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
129 Id., 372 N.E.2d at 294, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 452.
130 Id.
13, Id.

132Id.
133 Id.

134Id.
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for violating the injunction.135 Levine was held liable for negligence
in the amount of $6,464,880 which was the estimated value of the
paintings sold to the Marlborough corporations.1 36 Likewise, Reis,
Stamos, and the Marlborough corporations were held jointly and
severally liable for negligence and appreciation damages in the greater
sum of $9,252,000. 137 Because the liabilities were found to be congruent, payment of the higher sum would satisfy the lesser liabilities and
the amount of damages would be reduced either by payment of the
fine or by the return of38any of the fifty-seven paintings sold in violation of the injunction.
On appeal, the defendants argued "that an improper legal standard was applied in voiding the estate contracts" in "that the 'no
further inquiry' rule applies only to self-dealing and that in case of a
conflict of interest, absent self-dealing, a challenged transaction must
be shown to be unfair."1 39 The court of appeals rejected the former
disagreement, noting that neither the surrogate nor the appellate
division of the New York supreme court had limited their decisions to
an interpretation of the "no further inquiry rule." The latter argument was rejected because there was sufficient evidence to justify the
opinion that the two contracts "were neither fair nor in the best
interests of the estate." 40 The court of appeals concluded that Reis
and Stamos clearly occupied a position in which their personal interests "conflict[ed] with the interest of the beneficiaries." 14' Similarly,
the court noted that Levine was under a duty to prudently manage the
estate. Consequently, Levine's reliance upon the advice of his attorney
for his failure to attempt to
did not shelter him from accountability
42
prevent the breach of his coexecutors. 1
Nonetheless, the defendants contended that the lower courts had
erred in awarding appreciation damages. 143 Distinguishing those situations where a trustee merely sold the property for an inadequate
price, the court of appeals determined that appreciation damages
provided an appropriate means to make the beneficiaries whole where
a trustee, involved in a conflict of interst, has participated in a wrong-

"'

Id.

Id. at 317, 372 N.E.2d at 294-95, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 453.
Id., 372 N.E.2d at 295, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 453.
128Id.
'"

Id.
Id.
141 Id.,
142 Id.
143 Id.

at 318, 372 N.E.2d
at 319, 372 N.E.2d
372 N.E.2d at 295,
at 320, 372 N.E.2d

at 295, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 453.
at 295, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 454.
401 N.Y.S.2d at 454 (citing G. BoGr, Tnusrs 343 (5th ed. 1973)).
at 297, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 455.
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ful transfer.' 44 Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the liability of
Reis, Stamos, and the Marlborough corporations for appreciation

damages reasoning that had it "not been for the breach of trust the

property would still have been a part of the trust estate." 45 Due to
the difficulty of assessing the value of the unreturned works of art, the

court of appeals stated that the surrogate would only be held to a
reasonable basis of computation achieved "through the exercise of

good judgment and common sense." 14 Because it was the conduct of
the defendants that rendered the calculation of damages conjectural
in the first place, the court concluded that such a rule was particularly
justifiable.

147

The preceding discussion of the relevant case law suggests the
ways in which courts have molded traditional legal theories to produce equitable results despite the diversity of problems that arise in
connection with art sales. Significantly, unscrupulous art dealers are
frequently the conduit of art forgeries or the perpetrators of fraud.
There is another aspect to the deceptive practices that so frequently
plague the art market, however, that is the problem of stolen art.
ART THEFT

At present, the most controversial issue facing attorneys who
handle cases involving art theft concerns the right of an owner to
recover stolen property. 48 The uncertainty that characterizes the

Id. at 321, 372 N.E.2d at 297, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 455-56.
Id. at 321-22, 372 N.E.2d at 297-98, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 456 (citing 4 A. ScoTr, TRusTs §
291.2 (3d ed. 1967)).
146 Id. at 323, 372 N.E.2d at 298, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 457.
17
Id. The court of appeals also affirmed the lower court's finding that the defendants had
abrogated the inter vivos contracts by their improper conduct in regard to the Rothko estate. In
addition, the former court upheld the latter's finding of contempt by virtue of defendants' bad
faith action of delivering paintings subject to prior commitments of sale after the issuance of the
injunction without informing the court of their intentions. Id. at 324, 372 N.E.2d at 298-99, 401
N.Y.S.2d at 457-58.
'4 See Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, No. 69 C93 (E.D.N.Y. June 12, 1981),
O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 170 N.J. Super. 75, 405 A.2d 840 (App. Div. 1979), rev'd, 83 N.J. 478, 416
A.2d 862 (1980). See also N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1981, at A20, ol. 1 (Napoleon letters stolen from
French Army Museum in Vincennes discovered at Newberry Library in Chicago). TuME, Oct.19.
1981, at 86. Approximately 267 books, including a seventeenth century edition of Galileo's
Discorsi, were recently found missing from the University College library in London. Shortly
after the discovery of the theft, ninety-nine of the books were recovered in New York City
following the arrest of a man who, posing as a Princeton University professor, attempted to sell
the Discorsiand three other texts to a book dealer for $11,000. Id. See also N.Y. Senate Bill 5222
§ 397a (1979). Section 397a which would regulate actions against non-profit organizations for
recovery of objects, provides:
144
4-
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law governing the ownership of stolen property is the direct result of

varying jurisdictional approaches compounded by difficult choice of
law questions where a transaction has been spread across state or
international boundaries. The general American rule is that a thief
cannot acquire good title to stolen property and can transfer no better
title to a good faith purchaser. 149 Although this principle serves to
resolve the conflicting claims of two innocent parties in favor of the
original owner, a number of exceptions have developed which soften
the harsh effect upon the innocent purchaser.
One such exception appears in section 2-403 of the Uniform
Commerical Code which provides that "[a]ny entrusting of possession
of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives him
power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary
course of business."' 5 0 The official comment to this provision notes
that the purpose of this policy is to protect "buyers from persons guilty
of . . .trick or fraud."'15 The term buyer in the ordinary course of
business is used according to the definition supplied in section 1-201 (9)
and refers to "a person who in good faith and without knowledge that
the sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights . ..of a third

An action to recover an object from a non-profit organization shall accrue on the
date of acquisition by the non-profit organization of such object, provided that
within one year from the date of such acquisition:
(a) The non-profit organization's acquisition of such object shall have been
reported in any one or more of the following: (i) a publication of the non-profit
organization, (ii) any regularly published newspaper or periodical with a circulation
of at least fifty thousand, or (iii). a periodical or exhibition catalogue which is
concerned with the type of object claimed; or
(b) Such object has been displayed or otherwise made accessible for a period or
periods aggregating at least one year during the three year period following the date
of acquisition according to the regular practice of such non-profit organization with
respect to such objects; or
(c) Such object has been catalogued by the non-profit organization and the
catalogue material has been and shall be available upon request to the public for at
least two years during the three year period following the date of acquisition.
Id. § 397a(2)(a)-(c).
I" See Kunstammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, No. 69C 93 (E.D.N.Y. June 12, 1981);
O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 170 N.J. Super. 75, 405 A.2d 840 (App. Div. 1979), rev'd, 83 N.J. 478, 416

A.2d 862 (1980).
"s

U.C.C. § 2-403. The Code states:
(3) "Entrusting" includes any delivery and any acquiescence in retention of possession regardless of any condition expressed betveen the parties to the delivery or
acquiescence and regardless of whether the procurement of the entrusting or the
possessor's disposition of the goods have been such as to be larcenous under the
criminal law.

Id.
15 Id., comment 2.
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party in the goods buys in ordinary course from a person in the
business of selling goods of that kind." 5 2 Thus, the Code, which has
been adopted to varying degrees by most states, provides some protection to the innocent purchaser.
In Porter v. Wertz, 53 the appellate division of the New York
supreme court had occasion to interpret section 2-403 of the Uniform
Commerical Code with respect to a stolen work of art. In Porter,
however, the innocent purchaser exception was held inapplicable to
an art dealer who had purchased a stolen painting from a delicatessen
employee. The plaintiff-owner in Porter sought to recover possession
of Maurice Utrillo's painting of the Chateau de Lion-sur-mer which
the collector acquired in 1969.154 Throughout 1972 and 1973, plaintiff Porter was involved in a series of art transactions with Harold Von
Maker whom Porter knew as Peter Wertz.155 In the spring of 1973,
Porter sold Von Maker a painting by Childe Hassam which Von
Maker financed with a $50,000 deposit and $100,000 in promissory
notes. 156 Porter also consented to the temporary display of the Utrillo
in Von Maker's home pending the latter's decision on purchasing
it. 1 57 Upon failing to receive the promised response, Porter made a
futile attempt to contact Von Maker in order to obtain the return of
the painting.156 When the first of Von Maker's notes was dishonored,
Porter initiated an investigation that revealed Von Maker's true identity as well as a long record of arrests. 59 At this point, Porter notified
the FBI in regard to the unpaid notes but failed to express his concern
over the whereabouts of the Utrillo. 160 Additionally, the parties'
respective attorneys negotiated an agreement whereby Von Maker
acknowledged the receipt of the Utrillo and a copy of Petrides' book
on the artist as well as his consignment of both to a third party.""'
Essentially, Von Maker promised to pay Porter the sum of $30,000 or
to return the painting within ninety days. 6 2 In the event that Von

x- Id. § 1-201(9).
" 68 A.D.2d 141, 416 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1979), aff'd, 53 N.Y.2d 696, 421 N.E.2d 500, 439
N.Y.S.2d 105 (1981).
Im 68 A.D.2d at 142-43, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 255.
15 Id. at 143, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 255.
158 Id.

157Id.
15 id.

15,Id. at 143-44, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 256.
'6
Id. at 144, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 256.
181 Id.
12

Id.
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Maker failed to meet his obligation, his attorney was instructed to
release a Cranach painting held in escrow into the custody and ownership of Porter in partial satisfaction of Von Maker's debt. 8 3 Unbeknownst to Porter, however, Von Maker had engaged the real Peter
Wertz to complete the sale of the Utrillo to the codefendant, Richard Feigen Gallery, prior to the signing of the contract with the plaintiff.1 4 Subsequently, a Feigen employee sold the
Utrillo to co-defendant Brenner who, in turn, arranged its sale to a
buyer in Venezuela. 15
The court framed the issue of ownership in terms of equitable
estoppel and the affirmative defense of statutory estoppel under section 2-403.16 In concluding that statutory estoppel did not bar recovery by the plaintiff, the court relied on its construction of the term
"buyer in the ordinary course of business." 16 7 According to the court,
Feigen failed to meet the statutory exception for two reasons. 6 8 First,
Feigen had purchased the Utrillo from Wertz, who was associated
with a gourmet delicatessen, as opposed to being a person in the
business of selling works of art. 16 9 Secondly, Feigen was not in compliance with the "good faith" requirement applicable to merchants
and defined in the Code as "honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." 170 In
the words of the court, fair dealing "should not-and cannot-be
interpreted to permit, countenance or condone commercial standards
of sharp trade practice of indifference as to the 'provenance,' i.e.,
7
history of ownership or the right to possess or sell an object d'art."'1
In support of its conclusion that Feigen had not met reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade, the court noted that
neither Feigen nor his employee had attempted to verify the ownership of the Utrillo despite possession of the Petrides book which dis2
cussed the provenance of the Chateau de Lion-sur-mer.17
In addition, the pair had not even bothered to ascertain Wertz's occupation,
although the latter had left the telephone number of the delicatessen
with the defendant-gallery. The court believed that such an investigaId.
Id. at 145, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 256.
ItsId.

1

ld. at 145, 147, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 257-58.
ItId. at 145-46, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 257.

Id.
t,Id.

Ib'

17uId.
171Id.

at 146, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 257.

Id. at 146-47, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 257.
I.

173

Id.
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tion would have at least put the gallery on notice that further verification was necessary before consummating the deal with Wertz. 173
Similarly, the court rejected the theory that Feigen was a goodfaith purchaser for value entitled to protection under the pre-code
doctrine of equitable estoppel. The court explained that equitable
estoppel arises from principles of fair dealing which prevent a person
who has induced the particular conduct of another from enforcing
rights which would effect an injustice. 174 The court then noted that
contrary to clothing Von Maker with various indicia of title or apparent authority to sell the Utrillo, Porter instead had Von Maker investigated and reported the latter's latest fraudulent activities to the
FBI. 75 Although Porter might have been aware that Von Maker was
an art dealer, the original agreement of the parties had restricted the
display of the Utrillo to Von Maker's home. 76 In addition, Porter
had taken the precaution of procuring a contract which took pains to
describe the business relationship. 177 The court reasoned that Porter's
actions could not be said to have "contributed to the deception practiced on Feigen by Von Maker and Wertz."

78

1

Feigen dealt entirely

with Wertz upon whom Porter had bestowed neither actual nor apparent authority to dispose of the Utrillo.179 Likewise, the court
refused to consider the theory that Wertz was the agent of Von
Maker. 8 10 The fact remained that Feigen should have made an attempt to verify the title of the Utrillo regardless of the practice in the
art trade.'"' In the words of the court, "commercial indifference to
ownership or the right to sell facilitates traffic in stolen works of
art." 8 2 For these reasons, the court held that Porter, as the true
Id. at 148, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 258. As explained by the court:
Equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais is the principle by which a party is absolutely
precluded, both at law and in equity, from denying, or asserting the contrary of, any
material fact which, by his words or conduct, affirmative or negative, intentionally
or through culpable negligence, he has induced another, who was excusably ignorant of the true facts and who had a right to rely upon such words or conduct, to
believe and act upon thereby, as a consequence reasonably to be anticipated, changing his position in such a way that he would suffer injury if such denial or contrary
assertion were allowed.
Id. at 147, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 258 (quoting 21 N.Y. Jun. Estoppel § 15) (1961).
175 Id. at 148, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 258.
178 Id. As stated by the court: "[p]ossession without more is insufficient to create an estoppel."
Id., 416 N.Y.S.2d at 259.
177 Id.
,78 Id. at 149, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 259.
179 Id.
174

180 Id.

181 Id.
182 Id.
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return or payment
owner of the Utrillo painting, was entitled to its
83
equivalent to its value on the date of the trial.
A second exception to the American rule governing the right to
possession of stolen property is found in relevant statutes of limitation.
Generally, if a thief does not conceal his possession of stolen property,
the owner's cause of action accrues at the time of the theft. 8 4 On the
other hand, if a thief conceals the stolen item, the owner's cause of
action does not accrue until the latter discovers or should have discovered facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.18 5 The question of
when an owner's cause of action accrues against the innocent purchaser of stolen property, however, presents a much more difficult
problem.
Theoretically, there are several possible events which could be
designated to trigger the running of the statute of limitations. Some
older cases hold that in the absence of concealment, the statute begins
to run when the stolen property is acquired by an innocent purchaser."8 8 More recent cases, however, have tended to ameliorate the
harsh effects resulting from the application of the latter rule.
In New Jersey, the recent case of O'Keeffe v. Snyder 8 7 sparked
88
considerable public interest in the ramifications of art theft.
O'Keeffe involved the alleged theft of three small oil paintings from a
New York art gallery in 1946.189 The location of the works of art
remained unknown to the artist until 1976 when she discovered them
in the possession of Barry Snyder who, in turn, had purchased the
9
paintings from third-party defendant Ulrich Frank for $35,000.1 0
O'Keeffe sued Snyder in replevin to regain possession of her work. 9
Snyder defended on the ground that he was a purchaser for value,
held title by adverse possession, and that plaintiff's recovery was
92
barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
In reversing a summary judgment for the defendant which was
based upon the expiration of the six-year limitations period as calculated from the date of the alleged theft, the appellate division of the

183

Id.

"ISee,
I$
id.
'8
'7

e.g., 3

AMERICAN LAW OF PROPMTX

§ 15.16, at 834-38 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).

Reynolds v. Bagwell, 200 Okla. 550, 551, 198 P.2d 215, 216-17 (1948).
170 N.J. Super. 75, 405 A.2d 840 (App. Div. 1979), rev'd, 83 N.J. 478, 416 A.2d 862

(1980).
,8 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, July 28, 1979, at 20, col. 6.
170 N.J. Super. at 78, 405 A.2d at 841.
,90 Id. at 78-79, 405 A.2d at 841.
' Id. at 79, 405 A.2d at 841.
192Id. at 81, 405 A.2d at 843.
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New Jersey superior court held that a thief cannot acquire good title to
stolen property and can transfer no better title to a bona fide pur-3
chaser where there has not been a vesting by adverse possession.'1
Accepting O'Keeffe's story that she did not know the whereabouts of
the missing paintings, the appellate division concluded that the defendant had not sustained the burden of proving that possession of the
paintings had been exclusive, adverse, open, and notorious through9
out the entire period of limitations. 1 4

The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the decision of the
appellate court, however, and remanded the matter for a plenary
hearing to resolve the issue of whether or not the paintings had
actually been stolen. 19 5 Noting that the critical legal debate involved
the determination of the point at which O'Keeffe's cause of action
accrued, the court elected to apply the discovery rule to replevin of a
painting in order to avoid the unjust results produced by a strict
construction of the statute of limitations. 96 The court observed that
"[t]he discovery rule provides that, in an appropriate case, a cause of
action will not accrue until the injured party discovers, or by exericise
of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have discovered, facts
which form the basis of a cause of action."' 197

Such facts would

necessarily include "the identity of the possessor of the paintings." 8
Citing an "explosion" in the number of art thefts and the extreme
difficulty of holding items of personal property in open, visible, and
notorious possession sufficient to place "the original owner on actual
or constructive notice of the identity of the possessor,"' 9 9 the court
suggested that the discovery rule "is more responsive to the needs of
the art world.

' 200

Under the discovery rule an artist who makes a

diligent, but unsuccessful effort to discover the whereabouts of a
stolen painting will not trigger the running of the statute of limitations. 20' Thus, the discovery rule shifts the burden of proof to the
original owner and judicial inquiry is focused upon the question of
"whether the owner has acted with due diligence in pursuing his or
her personal property. ' 20 2 The adequacy of the owner's effort is
judged on a case-by-case basis. 20 3 Where the original owner does not
Id. at 82, 87, 92, 405 A.2d at 843, 846, 848.
191Id. at 83-84, 405 A.2d at 844.
1.5O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 484, 488, 416 A.2d 862, 865 (1980).
16 Id. at 493, 416 A.2d at 870.
"IoId. at 491, 416 A.2d at 869.
198Id. at 493, 416 A.2d at 870.
,99Id. at 496-97, 416 A.2d at 871-72.
200 Id. at 497, 416 A.2d at 872.
201Id. at 497-98, 416 A.2d at 872.
193

202

Id.

203

Id. at 499, 416 A.2d at 873.
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exert due diligence in recovery, the expiration of the statute of limitations will vest title in the possessor. 20 4 This is true even where there
have been successive purchases, since each new conversion tacks on to
the prior period of possession without causing the statute of limitations
to start running anew. 20 5 According to the O'Keeffe court, application of the discovery rule would encourage more careful investigation
of the provenance of art works offered for sale by private parties and
20 6
would promote purchases from legitimate dealers.
The New York supreme court applied a different rule for determining the commencement of the statute of limitations with respect to
an innocent purchaser of stolen art in Menzel v. List.20 7 In Menzel,
the plaintiffs had purchased a painting, entitled The Peasantand the
Ladder, by Marc Chagall at a Brussels auction in 1932.208 Eight
years later, the German invasion caused the Menzels to flee Belgium
without their possessions. 20 9 When the couple returned home in
1946, they discovered a receipt in place of the Chagall which had been
confiscated by the German authorities. 2 10 The location of the painting remained a mystery until 1955 when it was purchased from a Paris
art dealer by the proprietors of a New York gallery. 21' The buyers,
Mr. and Mrs. Perls, relied solely on the reputation of the seller and
made no inquiry regarding the provenance of the Chagall. 212 Later
that year, the Perls sold the work to List for the sum of $4,000.213 In
1962, Mrs. Menzel learned that the Chagall was in the possession of
List and demanded its return.2 1 4 List refused her request and Mrs.
Menzel instituted an action in replevin. 2 5 List, in turn, filed a thirdparty complaint against the Perls alleging breach of implied warranty
of title.2 16 The statute of limitations was one of the defenses raised by
List based upon the time elapsed either since 1941 when the Nazis
confiscated the painting or 1955 when List acquired the painting from
the Perls. 21 7 The court held that the statute of limitations defense was
o4 Id. at 500, 416 A.2d at 873-74.
." Id. at 503, 416 A.2d at 875-76.
206 Id. at 499, 416 A.2d at 873.
207 24 N.Y.2d 91, 246 N.E.2d 742, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1969).
20' 24 N.Y.2d at 93, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 980, 246 N.E.2d at 742.
20qId., 298 N.Y.S.2d at 980, 246 N.E.2d at 743.
"10 Id.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id.

2.1Id. at 93-94, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 980, 246 N.E.2d at 743.
21 Id. at 94, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 980, 246 N.E.2d at 743.
"216 Id.
217 Menzel v. List, 49 Misc.2d 300, 304, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 809 (Sup. Ct. 1966), modified on
other grounds, 28 A.D.2d 516, 279 N.Y.S. 608 (1967), modification rev'd, 24 N.Y.2d 91, 246
N.E.2d 742, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1969).
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unavailable to List based upon the rule that "[iln replevin, as well as
in conversion, the cause of action against a person who lawfully comes
by a chattel arises, not upon the stealing or the taking, but upon the
defendant's refusal to convey the chattel upon demand. ' 218
More recently, a federal district court judge in New York applied
the demand and refusal rule of Menzel in granting summary judgment
to a plaintiff-museum.2 19 The application of New York law by the
federal court in the context of art stolen abroad and claimed by a
foreign museum is significant in view of the defendant's argument
that the law of the place of theft recognized the title of a good faith
purchaser. In Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicojon, the Weimar
Museum, located in the German Democratic Republic, commenced
an action against Edward Elicofon to recover two fifteenth century
portraits painted by Albrecht Dfirer.22 0 According to the deposition 221 of Dr. Walter Sheidig, 222 the museum Director from 1940 until
1967, the portraits and other paintings had been stored in the Schloss
Schwarzburg in 1943 in anticipation of Allied bombing at
Weimar. 22 3 When American forces occupied the area known as
Thuringia in 1945, the United States Military Government gave
Sheidig permission to visit various depositories including Schwartzburg. 22 4 On his first trip to the castle on June 12, 1945, Sheidig, in
the company of several American soldiers stationed there, found the
storeroom locked and its contents undisturbed.2 25 While transacting
United States Military Government business at Schwarzburg on June
27, 1945, however, Sheidig discovered that the inner door to the
depository had been forced open and the storeroom ransacked. 2 6 As
stated in a memorandum written by Dr. Sheidig and dated July 3,
1945,227 "[tlhe two Duerer pictures were not anymore in their old
place and could, for the time being, not be found." 22 8 Following the
Russian occupation of Thuringia on July 2, 1945, Sheidig initiated a
2 29
fruitless search for the missing paintings.

218

Id.

219No. 69C 93 (E.D.N.Y. June 12, 1981).
220 Id., slip. op. at 2.
"2 Id. at 10.
21 Dr. Sheidig died in 1974. Id. at 10.
223

Id.

221 Id. at 11.
225

Id.

228 Id. at 12.
227

Id.

228 Id. at 13.

2

Id. at 14-16.
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The defendant, Edward Elicofon, stated that he had purchased
the Diirer portraits in 1946 "for $450 from a young American exserviceman .

. who appeared at Elicofon's Brooklyn home with

about eight paintings and who told Elicofon that he had purchased
the paintings in Germany. ' 230 Elicofon displayed the paintings in his
home until 1966 when a friend informed him of their presence on a list
of stolen works of art.2 31 Thereafter, Elicofon publicized his posses-

portraits, precipitating the museum's demand for
sion of the Diurer
2 32
their return.
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court delineated
the issue as "whether the facts

. . .

indicate that Elicofon bought the

paintings from one who was incapable of conveying title. ' 233 Concluding that the Direr portraits had been stolen from Schloss
Schwarzburg between June 12 and July 19, 1945,234 the court addressed Elicofon's contention that if a German architect living on the
castle grounds had stolen the paintings, the architect "could have
transferred good title to an innocent purchaser in Germany," and
thereby to a subsequent transferee by virtue of the German law of
"good faith acquisition." 235 According to the district court, a person
can only acquire ownership from one who has no title where the
owner parted voluntarily with his dominion over the painting. Furthermore, the painting must be obtained from a person who had
possession, and "the purchaser must have believed in good faith that
the person was the actual owner of the paintings, and that belief must
not have been grossly negligent. 236 The court then analyzed the
three types of possession recognized under German law, 237 and reId. at 8.
Id.
232 Id.
23 Id. at 9.
23 Id. at 19-20.
23S Id. at 25.
2m id. at 27.
23, Under German law, the ability to transfer good title depends upon the type of possession:
German law distinguishes among three types of possession-indirect possession
("MittelbarerBesitz"), direct possession ("UnmittelbarerBesitz") and the mere exercise of physical control by a so-called possessor's servant ("Besitzdiener"). An indirect
possessor is one who has immediate and authorized access to property, and may, in
turn authorize another to exercise actual control over such property; an indirect
possessor does not himself have physical custody of the property. A direct possessor is
one who exercises control over property in his physical possession pursuant to the
authorization of an indirect possessor. A possessor's servant is one who exercises
actual control over property for another in a relationship in which he is required to
comply with the other's instructions concerning the property; a possessor's servant
does not acquire "possession" in the legal sense, that is, does not have actual power of
control over a thing. . . which remains with the direct or indirect possessor.
Id. at 28.
'm

231
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jected Elicofon's argument that the architect was either a possessor or
a possessor's servant who could transfer title to a good faith purchaser.2 18 It was clear to the court that the American unit stationed
at Schloss Schwarzburg was in charge of the storeroom .239 Even if the
architect had been a custodian, however, the court stated that German law neither permitted a public servant to transfer good title nor
240
allowed such an official to achieve the status of a legal possessor.
Similarly, the court rejected the view "that a good faith acquisition is
possible from a possessor's servant whose social dependence is not
apparent to his purchasers," because the possessor did not voluntarily
241
part with dominion over a chattel which was sold illegally.
The district court further rejected Elicofon's argument that even
if he did not acquire good title to the portraits at the time of purchase,
242
he later acquired it by virtue of the German doctrine of Ersitzung.
As explained by the court, the law of Ersitzung permits a purchaser to
obtain "title to movable property . . . by a good faith acquisition of
the property plus possession of it in good faith, and without notice of a
defect in tide, for the statutory period of ten years from the time the
rightful owner loses possession. '2 43 The court, however, concluded
that Ersitzung was inapplicable to the present case because "New
York's choice of law dictates that questions relating to the validity of a
transfer of personal property are governed by the law of the state
where the property is located at the time of the alleged transfer."2 4 As
noted by the court, the application of a "significant relationship" test
would produce the same result due to "the contacts of the case with
New York. ' 245 Since the paintings were acquired and remained in
New York, the state had an "interest in regulating the transfer of title
in personal property in a manner which best promotes its policy" of
precluding a purchaser from acquiring good title from a thief.2 48 By
limiting questions of ownership to the issue of whether a theft had
occurred, the New York courts were able "to preserve the integrity of

2' Id. at 29.
219 Id. at 29-30.
240 Id. at 30-31. The court noted that the result would have been the same had Military
Government Law No. 52 been in effect at the time of the theft because Law No. 52 precludes the
transfer of good title. Id. at 36, 40.
241, id. at 32.
242 Id.

at 41.

243 Id.

244 Id.
215 Id. at 42-43.
240 Id. at 43.
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transactions and prevent the state from becoming a marketplace for
247
stolen goods.

The court also disagreed with Elicofon's theory that the Weimar
Museum's claim was barred by New York's three-year statute of limitations. Citing Menzel v. List, the court reiterated the rule "that 'the
statute of limitations d[oes] not begin to run until demand and refusal."' 12 48 In the view of the court, the demand rule was reasonable
in light of the fact that the bona fide purchaser's possession is initially
lawful, and only becomes unlawful once he has refused, upon demand, to return the property to the true owner. '249
Finally, the court held that the Weimar Museum had standing
and capacity to pursue an action to recover possession of the portraits 250 insofar as the German Democratic Republic was the legal

successor to the property rights of the predecessor state,25 ' as well as
by virtue of the fact that the German Democratic Republic's Minister
of Culture had issued an order conferring juristic status on the mu-

seum in accordance with German law. 252 Accordingly, the district
court ordered defendant Elicofon to deliver the two Diirer portraits to
253
the Kunstsammlungen zu Weimer.
The transportation of stolen art across international boundaries
suggests additional problems, particularly when a work has been sold
in a foreign country which recognizes ownership by a bona fide
purchaser. This issue was addressed by the English court in
Winkworth v. Christie Manson and Woods, Ltd. 254 In Winkworth,
several works of art were stolen from the plaintiff's home in England
and transported to Italy. 255 There they were sold to Dr. D'Annone
17 Id. at 43-44.
' IId. at 49 (quoting Menzel v. List, 22 A.D.2d 647, 647, 253 N.Y.S.2d 43, 44 (1964), on
remand 49 Misc.2d 300, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. 1966), modified on other grounds, 28
A.D.2d 516, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1967), modification revd, 24 N.Y.2d 91, 246 N.E.2d 742, 298
N.Y.S.2d 979 (1969)).
10 Id. The court considered the demand rule to be fair to the bona fide purchaser as well.
First, a thief who conceals his possession and thereby makes it impossible for the
owner to institute suit within the limitations period may be estopped from asserting
the statute of limitations as a defense. . . . Second, . . . a demand cannot be
indefinitely postponed by plaintiff because there is a requirement that it be made
within a reasonable time.
Id. at 50. In the present case, the court found that there was no unreasonable delay in making a
demand of Elicofon for the return of the portraits as the museum had conducted a diligent search
for the paintings. Id. at 52-53.
"-'1 Id. at 71.
2,1 Id. at 66.
!I' Id. at 71.
251 Id. at 79.

- [1980] 1 Ch. 496.
2s Id. at 498.
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who, in turn, returned them to England for auction by Christie's. 25
Winkworth, the original owner, sued for a declaration that the stolen
"works of art ha[d] at all material times been his property"; for
injunctions to restrain the defendants from disposing of the property
or from receiving the proceeds from the sale of the same; and for the
return of the works or their value plus damages for detinue or conversion. 25 7 The suit against Christie's was dropped when the auction
house agreed to reserve the proceeds of sale pending the outcome of
the litigation.25 8 The English court approved the following rule:
[T]he proprietary effect of a particular assignment of movables is
governed exclusively by the law of the country where they are
situated at the time of the assignment. An owner will be divested of
his title to movables if they are taken to a foreign country and there
assigned in circumstances sufficient by the local law to pass a valid
title to the assignee. The tile recognized by the foreign lex situs
overrides earlier and inconsistent titles no matter by what law they
2 59
may have been created.
In the view of the court, the fact that the works of art were stolen in
England where a good faith purchaser would not obtain good title,
were clandestinely transported to and sold in Italy, and were later
returned to England where they were sold with the proceeds remaining within the country, did not alter the result that the question of
28 0
title was controlled by Italian law.
The foregoing discussion of applicable case law demonstrates the
uncertainty that accompanies the determination of ownership with
respect to stolen art. Similarly, the lack of uniformity that characterizes state statutes governing this area of law encourages a type of
"forum-shopping" by those who wish to dispose of stolen art. The
latter problem becomes particularly acute when the stolen object is
transported across international boundaries to a country that recognizes the title of an innocent purchaser. 26' To date, the effect of
"laundering" art works stolen in the United States by selling them to a
good faith purchaser in a foreign nation and then returning them for
sale in this country is unclear. Another ramification of the international traffic in stolen art concerns the theft and smuggling of antiquities.
258 Id. at 499.
2 7 Id. at 498.
"m

239

Id. at 499.
Id. at 513 (quoting G.CHEsiRE & P.

NORrH, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 527

(10th ed.

1979)).

Id. at 514.
261THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK CoMMrrTEE ON ART LAW AND
VOLUNTEER LAWYERS FOR THE ARTs, CONFERENCE ON ARTS AND THE LAW (April 2, 1981).
260
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STOLEN ANTIQUITIES

The plunder of cultural property has been a popular pastime

since antiquity when victorious armies marched homeward laden
with the spoils of war. 262 In modern times, the pillage has assumed
the form of a flourishing black market in stolen artifacts which has
resulted in the destruction of important archaeological sites around

the world. 2 3 Typically, the process begins in culturally rich, but
economically underdeveloped nations, where native looters discover
and unsystematically dismantle ancient monuments leaving behind an
unintelligible rubble for scientific study.2 64 The public loss of beautiful and valuable art objects is but one aspect of the problem, however,
for archaeologists must record the precise location and depth of every

fragment uncovered in order to reconstruct accurately the early his2 65

tory of mankind.
The illegal excavation and sale of ancient art bears political
consequences in international affairs as well. 266 Many developing
nations have come to the realization that the cultural past is a source
of self-respect and identity for its citizens . 2 7 The presence of ancient
monuments and art treasures in a country engenders scholarly research, enriches the intellectual life of its citizens, and provides histor-

ical continuity with ancestral generations.

8

When promoted as a

tourist attraction, art objects are a boon to the national economy as

well. 2 69

262 See, e.g., Palmer, Symposium: Legal Aspects of the InternationalTraffic in Stolen Art, 4
SYRACUsE J. INT'L L. & CoNI. 51 (1976); Rogers, The Legal Response to the Illicit Afovement of
Cultural Property, 5 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 932, 933 (1973).
281 See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 262.
'1
See, e.g., id.; Comment, Legal Restrictions on American Access to Foreign Cultural
Property, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 1177, 1178-79 (1978).
211 See Comment, supra note 264, at 1179.
The plundered materials especially the archaeological artifacts, have a dual
importance for humanity. In addition to being attractive pieces of art, cultural
objects also serve as documents of the past.... Such documents, however, cannot
be read properly once they are removed from their original site. When taken from an
illegal excavation, a cultural object is usually smuggled out of the country with every
attempt made to hide its true origins ....
Knowledge of its precise archaeological
environment becomes a mystery. The result is a beautiful, but meaningless, work of
art; for the historical significance of the work, once taken out of its context, is forever
lost.
Id.
2W See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 262, at 934.
257 Id. at 935. Examples of cultural objects of national importance include: the Hungarian
Crown of St. Stephen; the American Liberty Bell; and the Afo-A-Kom belonging to the Kom of
the Cameroons. See J. Merryman, The Protectionof Artistic NationalPatrimony Against Pillaging and Theft, in A-rr LAW DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 233, 255 (L. DuBoff ed. 1975).
2" Rogers, supra note 262, at 935.
209 See id.; Comment, supra note 264, at 1179.
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The equation of art and "big business," however, is not without
unfortunate side effects. Predictably, a national interest in the preser-

vation of cultural property is at odds with the current obsession for
buying and selling works of art.2 70 In the capital rich countries of the

world, art has come to be regarded as an economic commodity to be
viewed as an investment, a hedge against inflation, a means of speculation, and a symbol of wealth. 7 1 As a result, art resources can be
manipulated to influence world politics2 72 or can be delivered to the
marketplace to enrich the pockets of illegal traffickers. Consequently,

to some degree, art has lost its elevated image of being appreciated for
its own sake and frequently "stands accused of.

tices."1

73

.

.distasteful prac-

The United States,2 74 followed by Europe and Japan, is the primary market for stolen antiquities.2 7 5 According to some authorities,
ninety percent of the artifacts sold in this country have been stolen or
smuggled from abroad.2 76 To date, however, the United States government has not extricated itself from its uncomfortable status as a

"dumping ground" for stolen art.277 Despite international diplomatic
pressure, this country has largely resisted the implementation of regulations favorable to art-source nations. 278 Presumably, the United
States' position is the product of two basic considerations.
The first argument in support of legislative inactivity with respect to stolen antiquities smuggled into this country is embedded in

270 E.g., The Effect of Efforts to Control Illicit Art Traffic on Legitimate International
Commerce in Art, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 462, 463 (1978). See generally Hawkins, The
Euphronios Krater at the Metropolitan Museum: A Question of Provenance, 27 HASTINcS L.J.
1163 (1976).
"I See, e.g., Palmer, supra note 262, at 51; Rogers, supra note 262, at 933.
272 Palmer, supra note 262, at 51; Rogers, supra note 262, at 934. As one commentator noted,
the illicit flow of art and artifacts "generates anger and resentment in the victim nations.
Programs of international cooperation are jeopardized and international tensions are exacerbated." Id.
113 Palmer, supra note 262, at 51.
211 According to the United States Customs Service, artifacts "now rank among the top 10
categories of smuggling." N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1981, at A17, col. 3.
275 See Rogers, supra note 262, at 934; Comment, supra note 264, at 1179. But cf. Fishman &
Metzger, Protecting America's Cultural and HistoricalPatrimony, 4 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. &
COM. 57, 58 (1976) ("as other areas of the world, such as the Middle East, become importers of
art works, the United States should focus upon regulating the export of those few works of art
important to the nation's historical or cultural patrimony").
276E.g., Ar LAw DoMESTC AND IN-rERNATlONAL 289 (L. DuBoff ed. 1975).
27 See Note, The Retention and Retrieval of Art and Antiquities Through Internationaland
National Means: The Tug of War over Cultural Property, 1 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 103, 104
(1979).
278 See, e.g., id.
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the theory that government control over the alienation of personal
property is inimical to a free enterprise system .271 The free-trade
position is espoused primarily by art dealers and museums which
object to overly burdensome regulation on the basis that exporters will
simply divert their illicit wares to other wealthy, art hungry nations. 2 0 A related argument is tied to the tight controls instituted by
many art-source nations as exemplified by Mexican law which prohibits even the exportation of duplicative or minor works despite a
severe shortage of storage space and the absence of protection for
objects left in situ. 28' Under the so-called black market theory, strict
control of art exportation has caused the price of artifacts to rise
dramatically, making such objects more attractive as investments and
thereby increasing the number of thefts.282 Thus, it is argued that
regulation by the United States would only serve to aggravate an
2 83
already vicious circle.
Significantly, the United States government has traditionally fostered the importation of art as evidenced by its duty-free status 284 and
its potential for income tax deduction as a charitable gift.28 5 More
than likely, the attitude that the United States is a relatively "art
poor" country has engendered the second justification for the failure
to implement regulation of cultural property. This is the view that
ancient art is the " 'legitimate heritage of all mankind and not just of
those states currently occupying the physical sites of early cultures.' ",286 Supported by scholars and art enthusiasts alike, this philosophy emphasizes the importance of art as a vehicle of communication.2 87 The international exchange of art expands appreciation for
unfamiliar art forms, increases understanding of foreign cultures, and
facilitates stylistic innovation through its influence on local artists.2 88
A related but less convincing argument is that removal of cultural

'2,1 E.g., id.
1

See Comment, supra note 264, at 1191.

2 Id. at 1190.
's2 Id.
2-3 Id.

284 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1976); I.R.C. § 170.
211 See Comment, supra note 264, at 1191.
2'11See id. at 1177, quoting A Bill to Implement the United Nations Convention on the Means
of Prohibitingand Preventingthe Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
Property:Hearingson H.R. 5643 Before The Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways
and Means. 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1977) (Statement of Mr. Emmerich as presented by Mr.
Ewing) [hereinafter cited as Cultural Property Bill].
267 E.g., Comment, supra note 7, at 463.
2S See Rogers, supra note 22, at 936; Note, supra note 270, at 463.
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property from its country of origin has been necessitated by the threat

of destruction by either natural or man-made forces. 289

At present, the United States continues to favor the interest in the
international exchange and sale of art over that of discouraging the

despoliation caused by illegal excavation and assisting foreign nations
in the preservation of their cultural patrimony. 2 0 Despite implementation of strict legal controls, the art-source countries do not appear to
possess the resources necessary to enforce the protection of national art
treasures. 29 1 In order to achieve the dual goals of protecting cultural
property and of encouraging the legitimate international exchange of
art, it is clear that the United States must embark upon a joint effort
with the exporting countries by enacting legislation aimed at decreasing the illicit trade in stolen antiquities.
Judging from the handful of cases dealing with the illicit traffic
in stolen artifacts, litigation may occur either in the context of a civil
suit for recovery or in that of a criminal prosecution under the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA).2 92 When an artifact has been
smuggled out of a foreign country and delivered for sale in the United
States, the foreign government may file a suit for replevin in an
American court.2 9 3 Such actions are rare, however, due to the complexity and expense of this type of litigation. 294 At the outset, a
foreign nation seeking a civil remedy must place itself in the hands of
an unfamiliar legal system.2 9, 5 To succeed in carrying the burden of
2" For example, Lord Elgin removed much of the exterior sculpture from the Greek
Parthenon in Athens and arranged for its shipment to England in the early part of the nineteenth
century. As noted by one scholar, "one often encounters the statement that they [the Elgin
Marbles] might have been destroyed or badly damaged-by negligence or deliberate vandalism
under the Turks, by the action of the elements, more recently by smog-if they had been left in
place." J. Merryman, The Protectionof Artistic National PatrimonyAgainst Pillagingand Theft.
in ART LAw DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 233, 235 (L. DuBoff ed. 1975). But see Rogers, supra
note 262, at 936.
'0 See Nowell, American Tools to Control the Illegal Movement of Foreign Origin Archaeological Materials: Criminaland Civil Approaches, 6 SYRAcusE J. INT'L L. & COM. 77, 83 (1978).
29 E.g., Rogers, supra note 262, at 935.
292 18 U.S.C. § 2311-2318 (1976). See, e.g., United States v. McClain. 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir.
1977); United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974).
"' See Complaint, Guatemala v. Hollinshead, No. 6771 (Cal. Super. Ct., filed Dec. 29,
1971), reprinted in FELDMAN, supra note 13, at 598-600. Although the case was later settled, a
complaint requesting possession was filed by the government of Guatemala in the superior court
of Los Angeles. Id.
294 E.g., Nowell, supra note 290, at 105; Comment, supra note 264, at 1180-81, Note, supra
note 277, at 122.
95 Nowell, supra note 290, at 105. Aside from proving ownership and title, a foreign govern.
ment seeking the return of stolen artifacts must contend with "conflicts of laws, proof of foreign
law, comity, damages, statute of limitations or laches, public law versus penal law, the distinction between goods, real estate and fixtures, and so on." Rogers & Cohen, Art PillageInternational Solutions, in AR' LAW DOMESTrIc AND INTERNATIONAL 315, 322 (L. DuBoff ed.
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proof, the plaintiff government must be able to show both ownership
and the right of possession. 2

8

Practically speaking, "[t]he possibility

of retrieval by the country of origin depends on its ability to discover
the whereabouts of the artifact, prove a claim that the object originated within its borders, and that it was exported in violation of its
laws, or was stolen.12 9

7

In view of the reality that smugglers make

deliberate efforts to obscure the origins of stolen artifacts and to
complicate the chain of title by passing the objects through several
countries,2 98 it is not surprising that foreign governments prefer to rely
mainly upon settlements, customs laws, 9 9 and diplomatic negotia30 0
tions in lieu of seeking a civil remedy.
Guatemala v. Hollinshead30 illustrates a noteworthy exception
to the general aversion of foreign governments for instituting civil suits
against American citizens to obtain the return of stolen artifacts. In
Hollinshead, the defendant-art dealer made arrangements to finance
the procurement of pre-Columbian artifacts with one of his coconspirators.3 02 Among the items acquired by the pair was the rare
and extremely valuable Machaquila stele 2 discovered in a Mayan ruin
of the Guatemalan jungle.30 3 The stele was cut into pieces and transported to a codefendant's fish packing plant in Belize, British Honduras. 104 There, the items were packed into boxes marked "personal
effects" and shipped to the United States where the defendants unsuccessfully attempted to sell them.3 0 5 The civil action was dismissed,
1975). See W. Ger. v. Elicofon, 358 F. Supp. 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), affd per curiam sub orn.
Kunstsammlungen v. Elicofon, 478 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 931 (1974),
which addresses the issue of standing in regard to an unrecognized foreign government.
216 E.g., Comment, supra note 264, at 1181.
7 Comment, Legal Approaches to the Trade in Stolen Antiquities, 2 SYRACUSE J. INTL L. &
CoM. 51, 53 (1974).
2' Cultural Property Bill, supra note 286, at 19.
-" Under 19 U.S.C. § 1497 (1970), the United States Customs Service may confiscate undeclared art objects brought into the country. Likewise, 19 U.S.C. § 1592 (1970) permits confiscation for fraudulent or false declarations by the importer.
The Customs Service recently seized a shipment of 700 pre-Columbian artifacts estimated to
be worth over one million dollars which a New York art dealer had illegally exported from Peru.
The Customs Service hopes to justify its unprecedented move by relying on the decision in United
States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir.), in which the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held the National Stolen Property Act applicable to illegally exported artifacts owned by a
foreign government. N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1981, at Al, col.2.
30 Note, supra note 277, at 122.
30, No. 6771 (Cal. Super. Ct., filed Dec. 29, 1971), reprinted in F. FELDMAN & S. WELL, ART
Wopus: LAw, POLICY, PRACTICE 597-609 (1974).
302 United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154, 1155 (9th Cir. 1974).
303 Id.
304 Id.

30s Id. In its complaint, the Republic of Guatemala alleged that the defendants offered the
stele "for sale for the sum of $350,000.00." Complaint, para. VII, Guatemala v. Hollinshead,
No. 6771 (Cal. Super. Ct., filed Dec. 29, 1971), reprinted in FELDMAN, supra note 13, at 598600.
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however, when the defendants agreed to return the stele to Guate3 06

mala.

While the Guatemalan government was pursuing its civil suit,
the United States government was successfully prosecuting Hollinshead in a criminal case.30 7 Despite the difficulties of proving scienter
and willful intent pursuant to a statute designed to combat the interstate transportation of stolen goods, the NSPA has been invoked in
cases involving artifacts stolen abroad and imported into the United
States.308 In United States v. Hollinshead,0 9 the Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction of an art dealer for conspiring to transport and causing the transportation of stolen property in
interstate commerce in violation of the NSPA. 310

On appeal, the

court considered the defendant's contention that the trial judge had
"erroneously instructed the jury that there is a presumption that every
person knows what the law forbids," and concluded that there is no
presumption of knowledge of the parameters of foreign law. 31

Re-

viewing all of the evidence and noting that the Guatemalan government had declared artifacts such as the well-known Machaquila stele
2 to be public property, the court stated that "[i]t would have been
astonishing if the jury had found that [the defendant] did not know
that the stele was stolen."' 31 2 The circuit court held that the govern-

ment was only required to prove that the defendant knew that the
stele had been stolen. "[I]t was not required to prove that [the defendant] knew where it was stolen. .

.

. It follows that it was not necessary

for the government to prove that [the defendant] knew the law of the
place of theft.

' 31 3

Thus, the court of appeals did not find the error

prejudicial when considered in light of the entire jury charge which
properly emphasized the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 31 4 The court concluded that it was unlikely that the jury would

presume that the defendant had knowledge of the law of Guatemala. 31 5

30 Nowell, supra note 290, at 105.
307United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974).
10818 U.S.C. § 2311-2318 (1976). Sections 2314 and 2315 have been held to be applicable to
stolen art objects.
309 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974).
310 Section 2314 provides:
whoever transports in interstate or foreign commerce any goods, ware, merchandise,
securities or money, of the value of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been
stolen, connected or taken by fraud . . .shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than 10 years or both.
18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976).
3,1495 F.2d at 1155.
312 Id.
313Id. at 1155-56.
314 Id. at 1156.
315Id. at 1156.
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A related issue was addressed by the Fifth Circuit in a case
involving less well-known artifacts in United States v. McClain.316 In
McClain, five defendants were convicted under the NSPA for conspiring to transport, receive, and sell stolen, illegally exported art objects
which had been owned by the Mexican government since 1897 when
that country "vested itself with ownership of all pre-Columbian artifacts." 3 17 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the
convictions after concluding that Mexico did not declare government
ownership of all pre-Columbian artifacts until 1972.318 The court
concluded that the NSPA was applicable only where a declaration of
national ownership had occurred before the illegal exportation of the
artifact.3 19 It reasoned that such an approach was necessitated by the
need to protect owners of stolen property without expanding the
meaning of the term "stolen" to include illegal exportation.32 0 Thus,
the court's decision is based upon a distinction between state regulation of property within its borders and acquisition of the actual ownership of such property. In its decision the appellate court pointed out
that "the state comes to own property only when it acquires such
property in the general manner by which private persons come to own
property, or when it declares itself the owner; the declaration is an
attribute of sovereignty." 32 1 While in McClain the pre-Columbian
artifacts were known to have been in the United States in May 1973,
the court remanded the case, noting that only the jury "could have
properly made the inference of 'recent exportation' [as any other
322
holding would] deprive the defendants of their right to a jury trial."
Despite the apparent ease with which the courts in United States
v. Hollinshead and United States v. McClain applied the NSPA to
situations involving the illicit traffic in antiquities, such a legal theory
is not without its problems. The paramount difficulty of utilizing the
NSPA to combat archaeological theft in foreign countries can be
traced to its origin as a statute intended to deal with the "theft of
standard, modern commercial goods clearly 'owned' and 'possessed'
by some person or corporation before their theft." 32 3 .Thus, while it
may be a simple matter to establish proof of knowledge, transporta-

1" 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977).
117 Id. at 994.
Th Id. at 1000.
3h, Id. at 1000-01.
I.,u Id. at 1001-02.
321 Id. at 1002-03.
3,.,. Id. at 1003.
323 Nowell, supra note 290, at 89. See also H.R. Rep. No. 1599, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); 78
CONe. Rrc. 8777-78 (1934).
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tion, concealment, barter, or sale for goods stolen in the United States,
the problems with respect to the foreign theft of artifacts are myriad.
The McClain case attempted to address some of the problems
inherent in the application of the NSPA to stolen antiquities. The most
involves the determination of the meaning of the term
basic hurdle
' 324
"stolen.

The McClain court wisely elected to steer clear of foreign

definitions of theft and relied instead on foreign laws regarding ownership. 32 5

Nevertheless, even the application of foreign concepts of

ownership is problematic in the sense that the United States may find
itself in the uncomfortable position of enforcing another country's
export laws, not to mention the inconvenience of identifying and
translating the applicable statute. 32 6 Furthermore, extensive application of the NSPA might conflict with foreign policy decisions.3 27 In

cases where the foreign nation neither recognizes private ownership of
certain artifacts nor claims national ownership of these objects, the
NSPA will provide no deterrence to the plundering of cultural property. 328 Finally, the anonymous nature of the majority of artifacts
hampers enforcement of the NSPA due to proof requirements of ownership and scienter, as well 32as9 the potential for falsifying information
as to the country of origin.

MARINE ANTIQUITIES

Technological advances in diving equipment have exposed the
sites of underwater shipwrecks to despoliation by looters rivaling that
of illegal excavations in third world countries. 330

The question of

ownership, however, is still hotly debated. Historically, marine
wrecks are characterized according to three classifications of property. The property can be res nullius because it either never had an
owner, all owners are dead, or it is abandoned. Secondly, the property may still be private property, but the owner may be unknown.
Finally, the property may never have been formally abandoned by its
owner, and the successors may still be able to exercise rights. 33'

324

On

Nowell, supra note 290, at 91-92.

3- 545 F.2d at 1000-01.
328 Nowell, supra note 290, at 93-94.
327

Id. at 95-96.

32

545 F.2d at 1000-01.
Nowell, supra note 290, at 96-102.
Altes, Submarine Antiquities: A Legal Labyrinth, 4 SYRAcUsE J.

329

330

INT'L

L. & COM. 77, 78

(1976). These underwater looters "'destroy wreck sites-even using dynamite to more easily
obtain the supposed treasure chests of Spanish doubloons, or cargo holds full of booty. Ships are
blown up, and the scientists' chance to chart the site is lost." Id.
331 Id. at 84-85; cf. H. MILLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MARINE ARCHAEOLOGY 18 (1973).
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the international scene, there are several different approaches to determining the status of shipwrecks.33 2 First, there is the perpetual

right to property which cannot be lost by non-use provided that the
owner unwillingly lost mere possession (Besitz). 3 Second, there is
the prerogative right of the state to the value of abandoned goods and
to goods of unknown ownership. 334 Third, is the right of the State to
terminate the rights of the owner by declaration (as in France) or by

335
statute (as in Spain) .

The applicable English law which preceded the American rule

does not appear to have become well-settled until about 1798.336
Under the English rule, "in the absence of the original owner, property recovered from the sea belongs to the sovereign . ' 337 Curiously,
American courts have traditionally reached the opposite conclusion
and, until recently, have consistently held that in the absence of the
original owner, property recovered from the sea belongs to the
finder. 338 Nevertheless, under both approaches, "the rights of the
original owner of property recovered from the sea are preferred to

those of either the sovereign or the finder.- 339 Similarly, English and
American courts agree "that the original owner does not forfeit his
property unless it has been abandoned-that is, unless all reasonable
hope and expectation of recovery have ceased." ' 340 Such an approach
accords with the view that the term "property" does not refer to a

physical object but to the right to the exclusive, beneficial use of that
object. 341

Hence, an undiscovered object absolutely relinquished by

its original owner does not have the status of property until it is found

332 Altes, supra note 330, at 85. Under the common law, the term "wreck" applied only to
property lost at sea which had come to shore. Today, however, the word "wreck" is frequently
used to designate flotsam (lost property floating at sea); jetsam (sunken goods thrown overboard
to save a ship); and ligan (buoyed jetsam which the owner will retrieve at some future time).
Kenny & Hrusoff, The Ownership of the Treasuresof the Sea, 9 WM. & MARY L. REv. 383, 384
(1967).
333 Altes, supra note 330, at 85. The wreck of the Dutch East India Company ship the
Amsterdam, beached off the English coast in 1749, provides an example of the perpetual right of
property. England recognized the Dutch claim to ownership by virtue of the Dutch State's
assumption of the rights and debts of the East India Company upon its dissolution in 1798. Id.
33, Id. at 86.
3' Id. at 87.
"" See Kenny & Hrusoff, supra note 332, at 390-91. In 1798, the English court in The Aquila,
165 Eng. Rep. 87 (Adm. 1798), settled a dispute over the cargo of the Swedish ship found
floating at sea in favor of the crown. Kenny & Hrusoff, supra note 332, at 390-91.
311 Kenny & Hrusoff, supra note 332, at 383.
I3
Id; see United States v. Tyndale, 116 F. 820 (Ist Cir. 1902).
3 Kenny & Hrusoff, supra note 332, at 392.
340 Id. at 393.
"' H. MILUR, supra note 331, at 18.
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and reduced to possession. 342 Upon the fulfillment of these two prerequisites, a marine artifact assumes its classification as abandoned
property. 343 At this point, the sovereign, under English law, or the

finder, under American law, need only prove that the original owner
is unknown in order to become the owner of the property. 344 The
American rule is frequently justified by the view "that while the
American sovereign has the inherent power to assert ownership of
property recovered from the sea, it-unlike the English crown-has

never actually done so. '' 34

Nevertheless, there appears to be some

uncertainty in this country regarding the ownership of marine antiquities.3 41 In the absence of any meaningful federal legislation34 7 in
this area, some of the coastal states have enacted statutes aimed at the

protection of underwater wrecks .348
Frequently, state legislation follows the discovery and salvage of
an important wreck. 349 Such was the case in North Carolina after the
state successfully enjoined certain salvage operations and secured the
return of artifacts removed from several wrecks. 350 In State v. Flying
"W" Enterprises, Inc. 351 the defendants were conducting diving operations and removing artifacts from three Confederate blockade runners and a Spanish privateer which had sunk within the territorial

waters of North Carolina. 3 2 Departing from the American rule, the
state supreme court held that where the owners of sunken vessels and
their cargoes had "abandon[ed] them so effectively as to divest title

Id.
Id.
344 Kenny & Hrusoff, supra note 332, at 393.
15 Id. at 394.
314 See., e.g., id. at 385 (discussing State v. Massachusetts Co., 95 So.2d 902 (Fla. 1956). cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 881 (1957), wherein Florida Supreme Court "'awarded ownership of a sunken
vessel to the sovereign, expressly invoking its version of the English common law as the basis for
decision"); Altes, supra note 330, at 87.
311But see 33 U.S.C. §§ 414-415 (1964) (Secretary of the Army has authority to remove sunken
crafts which obstruct navigable waters of United States).
346 The statutes enacted to date are: FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 267.011-.14 (West 1975): GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 40-813a to -814a (1975); HAWAii REv. STAT. §§ 6E-1 to -15(1976); Miss. CODE ANN. §§
39-7-1 to -39 (1972); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Chs. 91 § 63, 6 § 180 (West 1973); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 121-22 to -33 (1974); R.I. GN. LAWS §§ 42-45.1-1 to -13 (1974); S.C. CODE §§ 54-7-210
to -280 (Supp. 1976); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-22 (Vernon 1969).
31 For example, Florida enacted regulatory legislation following the discovery of a Spanish
Flota Plata which had sunk off the coast of Cape Canaveral in 1715. Altes, supra note 330, at 90.
350 State v. Flying "W" Enterprises, Inc., 273 N.C. 399, 160 S.E.2d 482 (1968).
331 273 N.C. 399, 160 S.E.2d 482 (1968).
3s2 Id. at 400-01, 160 S.E.2d at 483. The ships included the Spanish sailing vessel Fortune
which sank in the early 1700"s; and the Confederate blockade runners: the SIS Modern Greece
sunk in 1862, the SIS Phantom sunk in 1863, and the SIS Ranger sunk in 1864. Id. at 403, 160
S.E.2d at 485.
142
343
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and ownership," the vessels were derelicts, the right to which had
and which now "belong[ed]
been the prerogative of the English crown
'3 3
to the state in its sovereign capacity. 5
A different approach was taken by the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. The Unidentified Wrecked
and Abandoned Sailing Vessel. 354 The Atocha was a Spanish galleon
which sunk during a hurricane in 1622 while en route from the Indes
with a cargo of bullion. 35 5 In TreasureSalvors, the plaintiffs sued for
the possession and confirmation of title to an abandoned shipwreck
which they discovered resting on the continental shelf outside the
territorial waters of the United States. 35 ' The United States, as intervenor, answered and counterclaimed, asserting title to the vessel under the Antiquities Act 3. 7 and the Abandoned Property Act. 358 The

district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, concluding
"that Congress ha[d] not exercised its sovereign prerogative to the
extent necessary to justify a claim to an abandoned vessel located on
the outer continental shelf." Thus, possession and title are rightfully
35 9
conferred upon the finder of the res derelictae.
On appeal, the government unsuccessfully urged several grounds
for reversal. While the government argued that the district court
lacked the requisite jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit concluded that "the district court [had] properly adjudicated
title to all those objects within its territorial jurisdiction and to those
objects without its territory as between plaintiffs and the United
States," but had not properly adjudicated title as to claimants who
were not parties to the litigation .300 The court of appeals further

353 273 N.C. at 414, 160 S.E.2d at 492; accord, cases cited in note 376 infra; cf. note 378 infra.
a- 569 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978).
'ss

The current value of the cargo was estimated at $250 million. Id. at 333.

"'

Id.

"'

16 U.S.C. §§ 432, 433 (1976).

40 U.S.C. § 310 (1976).
354Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. The Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 408 F.
Supp. 907, 911 (S.D. Fla. 1976).
3.0 569 F.2d at 335-36. The court of appeals determined that the district court had jurisdiction:
The government, by intervening in this action and by stipulating to the court's
admiralty jurisdiction . .. .waived the usual requirement that the res be present

within the territorial jurisdiction of the court and consented to the courts' jurisdiction to determine its interest in the extraterritorial portion of the vessel.
Alternately, we note that assuming a lack of in rem jurisdiction of that part of the
wreck lying outside the territorial waters of the United States, the district court is not
deprived of jurisdiction over the government's counterclaim if that claim rests upon
an independent basis of jurisdiction. . . .While no basis of jurisdiction was stated in
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rejected the government's contention that the district court had misapplied the law of salvage due to the lack of a marine peril. 36 '

Noting

that the Atocha was an abandoned vessel, the appellate court approved the applicability of the law of finds once the original owner
has been divested of title. 362 "Under this theory, title to abandoned

property rests in the person who reduces that property to his or her
possession."' 3 3 The court explained that the "[d]isposition of a
wrecked vessel whose very location has been lost for centuries as
though its owner were still in existence stretches a fiction to absurd
lengths. ' 3 4 At the same time, the court determined that the law of
salvage compelled a comparable result since the requirement of a
marine peril was satisfied by the possibility that the Atocha could be
lost again in the face of hostile natural elements. 365 Either way, the
plaintiffs would be entitled to the "tackle, armament, apparel and
cargo" of the Atocha in the event that the government failed to prevail
366
in its claim of ownership.
The crux of the government's claim to the Atocha was based
primarily on two theories. First, the government argued the applicability of the Antiquities Act which is geared toward the protection of
historic landmarks situated on "lands owned or controlled by the
Government of the United States."' 36 7 According to the government,
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) 3 8 was intended to
extend the jurisdiction "of the United States to the outer continental
shelf. ' 36 9 The court of appeals, however, took the position that
congressional extension of jurisdiction under OCSLA was intended to
control the exploitation of and resolve competing claims to "the natural resources of the offshore seabed and subsoil" which is not necessarily the equivalent of an extension of sovereignty. 370
the counterclaim regarding the extraterritorial portion of the wreck, the record
reveals that the government based its claim to rights in the sunken vessel on the
Antiquities Act .

..

and the Abandoned Property Act ....

The district court thus

had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to determine the applicability of these
statutes to that portion of the vessel situated in international waters.
Id. at 335.
361 Id. at 336.
312 Id. at 336-37.
38 Id. at 337.
384

Id.

385 Id.
35. Id.

Id.
3-8 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1976).
36 569 F.2d at 338.
370 Id. at 339.
387
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The United States' second argument in support of its claim to
ownership of the Atocha was its position as successor to the prerogative rights of the English Crown. 371 According to the government's
theory, "the English common law rule-granting the Crown title to
abandoned property found at sea and reduced to possession by British
subjects-[was] incorporated into American law, and . . . Congress
372
[had] specifically asserted jurisdiction over the res in this dispute."
Recognizing "the constitutional power of Congress to take control of
wrecked and abandoned property brought to shore by American citizens (or the proceeds derived from its sale)," the court noted the lack
of legislation to that effect.3 73 In short, the court could find nothing
in the Antiquities Act or the case law relevant to the Abandoned
Property Act to support the subrogation of the United States to the
prerogative rights of the English King, in accordance with the Ameri374
can rule.
The court of appeals decision in Treasure Salvors accords well
with precedent in the federal courts which has adhered to the "rule
that, after the original owner, the finder's claim is preferred to the
sovereign's. ' 375 Confusion arises, however, with respect to the ownership of a wreck which lies in the territorial waters of a coastal state.
If a number of state courts elect to follow the reasoning of State v.
Flying "W" Enterprises, Inc. and its predecessors, 3 76 the effect could
be a significant change in American law. As noted by one authority,
the decreasing importance of ownership concepts in modern law has
brought the American rule full circle. "There are many cases in
which, for tax reasons, it is a clear advantage not to own something,"
and if the property is taken by the Internal Revenue Service instead of
the Queen, "there is no purpose to being an owner under American
law rather than a mere finder under the English rule.13 77 Conversely,
if one construes Flying "W" Enterprises, Inc. as giving the state a
proprietary right on the basis of prior possession, the supposed prefer-

371 Id.
172 Id.

at 340.
at 340-41.
313 Id. at 341.
114 Id. at 341-43.
3'- Kenny & Hrusoff, supra note 332, at 398. See also United States v. Tyndale, 116 F. 820 (1st
Cir. 1902) (money found on body floating on high seas belonged to finder); Murphy v. Dunham,
38 F. 503 (E.D. Mich. 1889) (coal lying at bottom of Lake Michigan belonged to finder).
3" State v. Massachusetts Co., 95 So.2d 902 (Fla. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 881 (1957);
The King v. Two Casks of Tallow, 166 Eng. Rep. 414 (1837); The Aquila, 165 Eng. Rep. 87
(Adm. 1798).
377 Kenny & Hrusoff, supra note 332, at 383.
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ence for the prerogative 378right of the sovereign becomes compatible
with the American rule.
NON-LEGAL SOLUTIONS

Having reviewed the major types of illegality in the art market
and examined the relevant case law, it is necessary to survey the
efficacy of both existing and proposed solutions. The most basic safeguard is, of course, buyer self-protection. It is simple common sense to
investigate and purchase from reputable art dealers. 379 Although this
method of art collection is not an absolute guarantee of authenticity,
it is noteworthy that many responsible dealers will refund the purchase price when doubts have arisen as to the attribution of a
work. 380

In the case of a contemporary artist, the buyer may either

observe the actual production of the work3 81 or question the artist so
as to confirm its authenticity. 382

If the buyer is interested in purchas-

ing the work of a deceased artist, however, it is wise to study the
artist's stylistic development, the identifying characteristics of3 his
38
work, his oeuvre, and the time period in which he worked.

If

possible, the buyer might find it helpful to compare known forgeries
378Specifically, North Carolina's Department of Archives and History had conducted diving
operations at the sites of the Confederate blockade runners for purposes of recovery and restoration some three years before Flying "W" Enterprises, Inc. appeared on the scene. By the time of
the defendants' "unlawful trespasses" in 1965, the state had opened a restoration center and
laboratory where artifacts from the wrecks were collected for identification and study. State v.
Flying "W" Enterprises, Inc., 273 N.C. at 401, 160 S.E.2d at 484. The weakness of this
particular analysis, however, rests in the successful state claim to ownership of the Spanish
privateer.
See Kenny & Hrusoff, supra note 332, at 398, which discusses the compatibility of the
decision in State v. Massachusetts Co., 95 So.2d 902 (Fla. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 881
(1957), with the American majority rule:
The Massachusetts Company had merely started operations, and had not yet obtained any possession to speak of, for such actions as marking the location of the ship
with buoys were merely indicative of an intention to salvage it, and could give no
possession that the law would protect. On the other hand, the people of the state had
long been using the ship as a fishing spot and for navigational purposes, and it would
seem that they had thereby taken possession. The possession required to give ownership is not necessarily active physical possession, but need only be such as the nature
and situation of the property in question allow, and since the state wished the ship to
remain where it was, it would be absurd to insist that it be raised and then restored
to the same spot in order for the state to acquire possession and the ownership
attendant thereon.
Kenny & Hrusoff, supra note 332, at 398. Note that the vessel at issue in this case was a battleship
sunk by the United States Coast Artillery as target practice in 1922. 95 So.2d 902.
379 E.g., DuBoff, supra note 8, at 980; Shientag, supra note 11, at 27; Note, supra note 9, at
937.
3w E.g., Shientag, supra note 11, at 27; Note, supra note 9, at 937.
381 E.g., DuBoff, supra note 8, at 980.
312 E.g., Hodes, supra note 7, at 75; Note, supra note 9, at 937.
33 See generally DuBoff, supra note 8, at 980; Note, supra note 9, at 937.
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or copies with the original work. 38 4 It is always a good practice to
question the seller closely as to provenance, acquire a certificate of
authenticity, and obtain a bill of sale. 385 Nevertheless, self-protective
measures are not infallible. The limitations of self-instruction in art
history become obvious when one stops to consider that differences of
opinion as to authorship exist even among experts. In addition, scientific analysis is neither foolproof nor inexpensive. 386 In view of the
uncertainty of many attributions, it is important that legislatures and
courts take steps to assure art buyers of protection in the event that
they are defrauded.
There is also a limited amount of support for the prospect of selfpolicing by art dealers. Possible approaches for this type of control
include the formulation and enforcement of a dealer code of ethics,
the formation of a panel of experts authorized to authenticate works
of art and to expose disreputable dealers, and the implementation of a
licensing association. 387 At present, the protection of the art-buying
public against fraudulent dealer practices is the exclusive domain of
"the local Better Business Bureau, the consumer protection division of
the state's attorney general's office, or the consumer fraud division of
the local police department."' 388 Ideally, however, art dealers should
not take liberties with the certainty of attributions and should inform
prospective buyers of any newly acquired information. "The use of
key phrases such as 'from the school of,' 'in the manner of,' or 'attributed to,' could alert a purchaser to the fact that authorship is in
doubt. ' 38 9 As with any self-regulating system, the success of a selfpolicing approach is wholly dependent upon the degree of integrity
that characterizes the dealer community.
The concept of an art identification system places the burden of
guaranteeing authenticity upon the artist. Such a system would require the artist to mark each of his works with a fingerprint preserved
by a chemical treatment or a special design and code impressed in a
color of the spectrum with a high atomic weight that is discernible via
x-ray or ultraviolet light. 390 Impressions would then be filed in a
central depository. Aside from facilitating authentication, the identifi-

"

E.g., DuBoff, svpra note 8, at 980.

35 Id.

3- See, e.g., Hodes, supra note 7, at 75.
"'

See generally DuBoff, supra note 8, at 1018.
" Id. at 1019.

- id.
"u E.g., DuBoff, supra note 8, at 1010; Hodes, supra note 7, at 78; accord, Note, s-pra note
9. at 938.
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cation system could conceivably act as a deterrent to forgers 39 ' and

serve to increase art sales by inspiring public confidence in the market. 392 Among the weaknesses of the identification system is its limitation to works of art produced after implementation of the plan.3 93 In
addition, the success of the system would obviously depend upon

cooperation by contemporary artists.
Organization of a national art registry is another solution which

has been proposed to protect the art buying public. 9 4 Under this
system, the artist-seller would file a certificate of authenticity, a
photograph of the art work sold, and information regarding the identity of the purchaser. 393 If the work of art were later resold, the seller
would record the transaction including the name of the new

owner. 39 6 The registered information would then be made available
to artists, dealers, collectors and law enforcement officials. 39 7 Once
the system became firmly established, buyers would be alerted to
proceed with caution with respect to an unregistered work of art.
Unregistered works would become more difficult to sell while registered ones would be likely to increase in value. 398 Predictably, the
success of a national art registry would depend upon the full support
of the artistic community. Clearly, it would be impracticable to
permit buyers to register art due to the potential for fraud.399 At the
same time, the registry could not provide a guarantee of authenticity
400
with respect to antiquities and other older works of art.
The illicit traffic in stolen antiquities and the slow development
of international agreements has led to the organization of private
interests as exemplified by the International Council of Museums
(ICOM). 40 1 ICOM, headquartered in Paris, boasts a membership of

391 E.g., DuBoff, supra note 8, at 1010; Hodes, supra note 7, at 78.
392 DuBoff, supra note 8, at 1016.
393 See Note, supra note 9, at 938; cf. Disposition of Fake Art, 26 THE RECORD OF THE
ASSOCIATION OF THE Bua OF THE CITY OF NEW YoRuK 591 (1971), reprinted in FELD.[AN, supra note

13, at 1085-86 [hereinafter cited as Disposition of Fake Art] (discusses pros and cons of permanently marking objects to denote forgery).
114E.g., DuBoff, supra note 8, at 1016-18; Hodes, supra note 7, at 78. See also Disposition of
Fake Art, supra note 393, at 1086-88, in which the Art Committee of the New York City Bar
Association proposed the establishment of a central registry of fake art. Significantly, the
Committee indicated its disapproval of the institution of an archive of fake art geared toward
educational purposes unless owners contributed forgeries on a purely voluntary basis. Id. at
1088. Note, supra note 9, at 938-39.
3's DuBoff, supra note 8, at 1016-18.
396 E.g., Hodes, supra note 7, at 78; Note, supra note 9, at 939.
397 Hodes, supra note 7, at 78.
366Note, supra note 9, at 939.
309 Id.
400 Id.

101See generally Fishman & Metzger, Protecting America's Cultural and Historical Patrimony, 4 SYRAcUsEJ. INT'L L. & COM. 581 (1976); Hamilton, Museum Acquisitions: The Case for
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3000 institutions from 100 countries. 402 Besides the promotion of
international cooperation among museums, the council has expressed

the necessity for its members to boycott the market in stolen antiquities. 40 1 In addition, the group has promulgated an ethical code designed to regulate museum acquisition policies. 40 4 In furtherance of
its goals, ICOM disseminates a list of stolen art objects, organizes
meetings to discuss law enforcement policies, and publishes a bulletin
of model acquisition policies. 405 Finally, the council maintains a
library containing information on such diverse topics as national an-

tiquities laws and loan exhibitions. 40 6 While ICOM's proclamations
are not legally enforceable, they do exert the positive effect of influencing public opinion as to the need for the protection of cultural
property. More importantly, member museums who refrain from
questionable practices in art acquisitions do much to encourage the
40 7
legitimate exchange of art.
LEGAL SOLUTIONS

Under currently existing state 40 8 and federal legislation, 40

9

art

purchasers are generally relegated to seeking relief under general antiSelj-Regulation, in A"rr LAw DoMEsTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 347 (L. DuBoff ed. 1975); Comment, supra note 264, at 1194-95; Note, supra note 270, at 470-471.
402 Comment, supra note 264, at 1188.
403 Nafziger, Regulation by the InternationalCouncil of Museums: An Example of the Role of
Non-Governmental Organizationsin the TransnationalLegal Process, 2 DENVER J. INT'L L. &
Poy'y 231, 244 (1972).
410 Id. at 245.
405 Id.

406Id. at 247.
407 Id.

101In regard to the possible efficacy of state Blue Sky Laws in the protection of art investors,
see In re Michael Gardner v. Louis J. Lefkowitz, 97 Misc. 2d 806, 412 N.Y.S.2d 740 (Sup. Ct.
1978), in which the state Attorney General's investigation of a sale of "investment quality
diamonds" (actually zirconium stones) through the use of fraudulent documents and high

pressure telephone solicitations was authorized by the Martin Act, N.Y.

GENERAL BVSINESS LAW

§ 23-A (McKinney 1967). The Act's protection against security frauds was applicable, in that the
defendants promoted the diamonds as an investment and a hedge against inflation and because
investors relied upon the expertise and efforts of the defendants to make the venture successful.
id.
401The copyright laws give the artist a monopoly over reproduction rights to his work. Under
17 U.S.C. § 302 (1977), "[c]opyright in work created on or after January 1, 1978, subsists from
its creation and [with some exceptions] endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and
fifty years after the author's death." The copyright laws, however, do not afford an absolute
protection against forgery. Many works of art are not copyrighted and many forgeries are not
imitations of an original art work. See also Trustman, supra note 48, at 87, which suggests that
surmoulages of bronze sculptures in the public domain and stamped with the original copyright
inscription offer "an avenue for [the] prosecution of foundries which market recasts as originals."

Id.
It has been suggested that art investors may be able to take advantage of the registration
requirements imposed by the Securities and Exchange Act. To date, it appears that the Securities
Exchange Commission would not recommend an enforcement action with regard to the offer

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:506

fraud statutes. 4 10 As noted previously, these statutes have proven to
be ineffective in controlling illegal practices in the art market for a
number of reasons. First, the penalties and risks for statutory violation
are slight in comparison to the potential for profit. Second, the fraud-

ulent or criminal intent proof requirement is difficult to fulfill and
encourages dealers to avoid making more than a casual inquiry as to
41
the origin of works which they offer for sale. 1
Despite these problems, however, many states continue to rely
solely upon the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code to protect
the art buying public. 412 Section 2-313 of the Code governs the
creation of express warranties by a seller of goods. 413 Judicial construction of the Code generally revolves around the issue of whether
the seller's statement was an affirmation of fact or a description which
became a basis of the bargain, thereby creating a warranty, or
whether the statement was merely the seller's opinion or an affirmation of value. 41 4 Application of the Code to art sales creates peculiar
problems of interpretation. 4 15 For example, if a seller describes a
painting as one "executed by Monet" and refers to its "extensively
documented provenance," the statement is likely to be construed as an
affirmation of fact or promise. 41 6 The use of the phrase "Monet
painting," however, is conducive to differing interpretations and
might be considered insufficient to create a warranty under the

UCC. 417

and sale of art portfolios. THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CrTy OF NEW Yom CoMMTrrTE

ON

Ar LAW AND VOLUNTEER LAWYERS FOR TIHE Aorrs, CONFERENCE ON ARTS AND THE LAW (April 2,

1981). But see SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib., Ltd., 388 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (sales
of rare coin portfolios constituted investment contracts and were therefore securities for purpose
of registration requirements of Securities and Exchange Act, as success of venture was dependent
upon defendant-promoter's efforts as well as on his selection of portfolios).
410 DuBoff, supra note 8, at 998. See also Disposition of FakeArt, supra note 393, at 1088-89,
which discusses the extension of laws dealing with libel, fraud, or the right of privacy as applied
to the false imputation of authorship or the use of an artist's name for advertising purposes in
terms of the confiscation of art forgeries which would ultimately be tendered to the artist or his
estate for destruction or reclamation. Id. Furthermore, The Art Committee of the New York
City Bar Association approved the issuance of an appropriate court order or directive to the
owner of the forged art work. Id. at 1089. To date, courts have not defined art forgeries as the
equivalent of contraband which can be "seized and confiscated." Id. at 1083-84.
411 DuBoff, supra note 8, at 998.
412 See generally DuBoff, supra note 8, at 1012; Hodes, supra note 7, at 77.
413

U.C.C. § 2-313.

414 See DuBoff, supra note 8, at 1002-03.
415 At least one writer has suggested that the results of scientific analysis or expert examination
of stylistic evidence are the equivalent of the technical specifications and blueprints approved as
descriptions in comment 5 of U.C.C. § 2-313. Comment, supra note 7, at 418.
410 See Comment, supra note 7, at 417.
417 See DuBoff, supra note 8, at 1003.
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The determination of whether the seller's statement constitutes
an affirmation of fact or a mere opinion presents a difficult problem of
interpretation. Due to the uncertainty of many attributions, it is
arguable that both buyers and sellers harbor opinions about the authenticity of an art object, thereby preventing the creation of an
express warranty. 418 Similarly, it has been suggested that since only
the artist or other eyewitness can make a factual statement as to
authorship, "a dealer's statement of authenticity is always his opinion" irrespective of reliance by the buyer. 41 9 Nevertheless, because
the art world customarily relies upon expert opinion to determine the
value of art objects, these reservations should be dismissed. As stated
by one commentator, "[i]t would seem only logical and equitable that
if the seller is supported by the benefits of something less than absolute, he also should bear the burdens of something less than absolute." 120 In short, the recognition that an expert's opinion as to
authenticity is the equivalent of an affirmation of fact would promote
greater stability in the art market by ensuring that buyers receive the
benefit of their bargains. 42' If a seller desires to protect himself he
may do so by resorting to an appropriate disclaimer grounded in § 2316 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 42 2 Protection through a gen-

eral disclaimer 423 of express warranties is likely to be held inoperative,
116 Id. at 1005.
419

420

Id.
Comment, supra note 7, at 417.

421 See id. at 417-18.
422 U.C.C. § 2-316. Subsection

one provides:
[wJords or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words or
conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever reasonable
as consistent with each other; but subject to the provisions of this Article on parol or
extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202) negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent
that such construction is unreasonable.
Id. § 2-316(1). Section 2-202 states:
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or
which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be
contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral
agreement but may be explained or supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade. . . or by course of performance...
and
(b)by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing
to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the
agreement.

Id. § 2-202.
4,3 See Comment, supra note 7, at 422-28, which approves the applicability of § 2-314 implied
warranties of merchantability and § 2-315 implied warranties of fitness for a particular purpose
to art sales. For a discussion supporting a more restrictive interpretation of § 2-314 and § 2-315 in
relation to the sale of art, see DuBoff, supra note 8, at 1012-15.
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however, since the drafters sought to protect the "buyer from unexpected and unbargained" for disclaimers that contradict the express
promises of the

seller.

42 4

To date, New York has made the greatest strides in implementing
legislation designed to stem fraudulent activitly in the art market. In
1967, New York enacted a statute which treats art forgery as a separate punishable offense. 425 A person commits the crime of simulation

when "[w]ith intent to defraud, he makes or alters any object in such
manner that it appears to have an antiquity, rarity, source or authorship which it does not in fact possess," or when "with knowledge of its
true character and with intent to defraud, he utters or possesses an
object so simulated.-

42

In New York, art forgery is a Class A misde-

meanor and the penalty is one year imprisonment and/or a $1000
fine. 42 7 The purpose of the statute is limited to the deterrence of art

forgers, however, and no relief is offered to the defrauded purchaser.
Recourse for the defrauded purchaser may be found under article
12-D of the New York General Business Law. 42 8 This statute provides

that a written statement of authorship that accompanies the sale of a
work of art constitutes an express warranty of authenticity. 429

By

430
limiting the application of the provision to sales by art merchants,
the legislature recognized that buyers rely upon the sellers's education
and experience in regard to works of art. Consequently, the seller
must avoid "puffing" as there is a statutory presumption that descriptions of authorship become part of the basis of the bargain. 43' The
legislature also considered custom and usage in the market by recognizing the degree of uncertainty that characterizes many attributions

424 U.C.C. § 2-316, comment 1.
425N.Y. PENAL LAW § 170.45 (MeKinney 1967). See also Disposition of Fake Art. supra note
393, at 1086, in which the Art Committee of the New York City Bar Association recommended a
tagging system to denote the status of art forgeries. A "person who knowingly remov[ed] such a
tag would be guilty of criminal simulation under section 170.45 of the Penal Law." Id.
426N.Y. PENAL LAW § 170.45 (McKinney 1967).
427Id. §§ 70.15, 80.05.
428 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 221-222 (McKinney 1975).
429 Id. § 219-c.
43 Article 219-b defines an art merchant as:
[A] person who deals in works of fine art or by his occupation holds himself out as
having knowledge or skill peculiar to works of fine art or to whom such knowledge
or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other
intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or
skill. The term "'art merchant" includes an auctioneer who sells works of fine art at
public auction as well as such auctioneer's consignor or principal.
Id. § 219-b.
431E.g., FELDMAN supra note 13, at 177; DuBoff, supra note 8, at 1011.

1982]

COMMENT

559

and approving the use of the terms "by a named author",
"attributed
4 32
to a named author", and "school of a named author.'
Disclaimers of warranty are permitted under New York law
provided they are printed clearly and conspicuously and "specifically
apprise the buyer that the seller assumes no risk, liability or responsibility for the authenticity of such work of fine art. ' 433 The seller's
protection is limited, however, because the disclaimer is rendered
inoperative if: 1) the work of art turns out to be a counterfeit and
there was no clear indication of such in the bill of sale, or 2) the work
was unqualifiedly stated to have been executed by a named artist and
the buyer can prove that "such statement was false, mistaken or
434
erroneous" on the date of sale.
Significantly, article 12-D is geared toward consumer protection
in the allowance of damages or recission where the buyer has acquired
a forged or misattributed work. 43 5 Overall, the statute is designed to
prevent "sophisticated sellers of art-so-called 'art merchants'-from
selling works purportedly by well-known names to unsophisticated
buyers of art. ' 436 Furthermore, this type of "express warranty" legislation effectively shifts the responsibility of ascertaining authenticity
from the buyer to the seller. 437 The statute is also advantageous to the
buyer because it eliminates any uncertainty as to "whether the written
description set forth in the bill of sale is sufficient to constitute a
warranty of genuineness. ' 438 Nevertheless, the statute has been the
subject of criticism. For example, it remains unclear whether or not
the original warranty applies to subsequent purchasers. 439 Secondly,
article 12D applies only to written representations. 440 There has also
been considerable discussion of the need for an additional statute
which would grant qualified immunity to accredited art experts

432N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 219-c (McKinney 1975).
43 Id. § 219-d.
434 Id.
435 FELDMAN supra note 13, at 176; e.g., DuBoff, supra note 8, at 1011.
43 AssocIATED COUNCILS OF THE ARTS, THE VISUAL ARTIST AND THE LAW 67 (1971).
437 Hodes, supra note 7, at 77.
438 Id.

439 Id.

440 N.Y. CE. Bus. LAw § 219-c (McKinney 1975). The weakness of this approach was noted
by the Art Committee of the New York City Bar Association which observed that:
As a practical matter, many works of art are sold with accompanying documentation. However, in the case of prints and graphic art, the only form of authentication would normally appear on the face of the object in the form of a signature and
number of the edition. The misdemeanor provision may have no applicability in
such instances.
Disposition of Fake Art, supra note 393, at 1083.
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whose opinion evidence as to the fraudulent nature of a work of art
later proved to be erroneous. 44' According to some authorities, such
immunity would encourage expert evaluation of works of doubtful
authenticity by removing the threat of liability to the seller in an
action for defamation.142 Proponents of qualified immunity theorize
will help to bring
that an increase in the number of expert evaluations
443
about the subsidence of fake art transactions.
A third New York statute provides that "[a] person who, with
intent to defraud, deceive or injure another, makes, utters or issues a
false certificate of authenticity of a work of fine art is guilty of a class
A misdemeanor. ' 444 A certificate of authenticity is defined as a
printed or written statement of opinion or fact "confirming, approving or attesting to the authenticity of the authorship of a work of fine
art, which statement is subscribed by the authenticator and is capable
of being used to the advantage or disadvantage of some person." 445
Such a subscription of authenticity constitutes "prima facie evidence
that [the authenticator] holds himself out as having the knowledge,
skill or expertise requisite to the making of such a statement." Because
the statute is directed toward any transaction involving the delivery of
a false certificate, an expert who supports an income tax deduction for
a charitable donation of art with a false opinion as to authorship
would be in violation of the law. Absent this statute, the falsification
of a written statement of opinion would not carry a penalty. 446
As a reaction to the abuse which has accompanied the expansion
of the market for art prints, New York and other states have enacted
so-called "Print Bills." ' 447 An effective fine print statute, exemplified

411 E.g., DuBoff, supra note 8, at 984 n.60 ("[i]n order to take advantage of this immunity,
the expert would be required to obtain certification from the New York State University Board of
Regents"); Hodes, supra note 7, at 77-78 ("[l]icensing of art specialists could be based on
certification by a State Board of Examiners").
442 Contra DuBoff, supra note 8, at 958-87.
Experts are professionals and should be held to the highest standard of performance.
They should be required to document the reasons for their conclusions. Even stylistic
experts can verbalize the facts upon which they base their findings. If they are
granted greater flexibility with their decisions and immunity from suit, it is likely
that their standards will decline. As a result, even more forgeries might flood the art
market.
Id. at 987.
44 Hodes, supra note 7, at 77-78.
44 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 219-i (McKinney 1975).
41% Id. § 219-h(c).
116 AssociATED COUNCILS OF THE ARTs, supra note 436, at 66.
447 See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1740-45 (West 1973); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, § 361-69 (1975);
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 220-a to 220-1 (McKinney 1975).
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by New York Assembly Bill 10809,448 which was never enacted, may
be categorized according to its requirements for: 1) disclosure; 2)
express warranties; 3) adjustments in the burden of proof; and 4)
enforcement. Typical provisions include the prohibition of catalogues,
circulars, labels or the like which do not clearly and conspicuously
disclose relevant information as to each edition of a fine print. Similarly, a fine print statute may require that a written invoice, receipt or
certificate replete with appropriate disclosures and disclaimers accompany the sale of a fine print regardless of the status of the purchaser. 449 Frequently, the statute will include a list of the "informa450
tional details" necessary for appropriate disclosure.
441 N.Y. AssF tMBLY
BILL 10809 § 220, No. 2 (1980). The Bill defines a "fine print" as
an impression produced in more than one copy by means including, but not limited
to, engraving, etching, a woodcut, lithograph, seriograph, photograph, photogravure or any combination thereof upon paper or any other surface, sold or offered for
sale for an amount in excess of fifty dollars exclusive of any frame. Pages, sheets, or
plates taken from books and magazines offered for sale or sold as fine prints shall be
included within the meaning of "fine print."
Id.
449 If an art merchant describes a fine print as a "reproduction," it is unnecessary to supply
"further informational detail unless it was allegedly published in a signed, numbered, or limited
edition or any combination thereof or is described as a 'fine print' or 'original' in which case all of
the informational detail required . . . is to be furnished." Id. § 221, No. 4.
150 The New York Bill provides an exhaustive list of informational details:
1. The name of the artist.
2. The year when printed or made.
3. [Specific identification of the medium or media employed for execution of the
print.]
4. Whether the finished fine print was signed by the artist.
5. Whether the finished fine print was approved by the artist.
6. The existence of any artist . . . . other than the named artist who assisted in the
[execution of the master image].
7. The [identity of t]he person.. . who supervised the production of the ..
print.
8. Exclusive of trial proofs, whether the edition is being offered as a limited edition
and, if so:
(i) the authorized maximum number of signed or numbered impressions, or both, in
the regular edition; and (ii) the authorized maximum number of unsigned or unnumbered impressions, or both, in the edition; and (iii) the authorized maximum
number of artists, publishers, printers etc., if any, outside of the regular edition.
9. Whether there is more than one print in the edition with the same individual
numbers or other markings denoting the limited edition.
10. Whether there was any prior or later editions from the same plate, the series
number of the subject edition and the total size of all other editions.
11. Whether there were any other prints or editions, limited or otherwise, from a
plate which is substantially the same or consists of the same image or of an image
which is substantially the same, and whether on the same or different paper with the
same or different ink or on or in any other medium or material.
12. Whether the plate has been destroyed, effaced, altered, defaced or cancelled
after the edition for which the disclosure is being provided.
13. Whether the edition is a posthumous edition or restrike and, if so, whether the
plate is the original one or has been reworked or otherwise altered.
14. The name of the workshop, if any, where the limited edition was printed.
Id. § 222.
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When a fine print is sold, these details become part of the basis of
the bargain, thereby creating an express warranty that may not be
negated by an art merchant 45' due to the absence of formal words in
the written instrument, the lack of intention or authorization'to create
a warranty, or because the statement was merely an expression of the
seller's opinion. 452 Disclaimers attributed to a lack of knowledge by

the art merchant are ineffective in the absence of proof that reasoninformational details, but
able inquiries were made to ascertain the
45 3
that such information was unavailable.

The New York Assembly Bill also contains strict enforcement
measures. An art merchant who has failed to supply or who has
erroneously supplied informational details must refund the purchase
price of the print plus interest when the buyer returns the print. If an
art merchant "offers or sells a fine print with intent to deceive,
defraud or injure another person by: (i) willfully failing to provide the
[required] informational detail . . . or (ii) willfully providing false

informational detail; or (iii) falsely disclaiming knowledge as to any
relevant informational detail; the purchaser" may recover an amount
equal to three times the purchase price plus interest. 45 4 There is also a

provision awarding costs of litigation, attorney fees, and expert witness fees to a prevailing purchaser. 4s5 Finally, the Assembly Bill
permits the state attorney general to seek injunctive relief for violations; restitution for entitled persons; and civil penalties in the case of
456
repeat offenders.

Print bills that contain provisions similar to the preceding example offer a forceful solution to problems of fraud in the sale of prints.
This type of print statute purports to obviate the need for new causes
of action in the belief that an informed consumer is capable of selfprotection. 457 Ultimately, the disclosure requirements aim to help the

print buyer make an informed choice by eliminating confusion, misleading information, and deceptive sales practices. 458

In the event

that a buyer is defrauded, however, the statute provides a meaningful
remedy.

451N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 219-b (McKinney 1975) defines "art merchant" for the purposes of
ASSEMBLY BILL 10809, § 220, No. 1 (1980) with the addition of the artist who "shall be deemed to
be an 'art merchant' with respect to his own work.
4-2 N.Y. ASSEMBLY BILL 10809 § 223, No. 1 (1980).
453Id. § 225.
-4 id.
455 Id.

456Id. § 226.
457See PUBLIC HEAruNc MEMORANDUM, supra note 42, at 3-4.
4SS id. at 4.
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From the preceding discussion, it is evident that New York legis-

lative measures offer the art buying public the best protection available in the United States to date. It is obvious, however, that uniform
state laws or federal legislation would do more to discourage illegal
practices in the art market. The picture is less optimistic with respect

to stolen antiquities. The possibility of achieving international cooperation with respect to the illicit trade in national cultural property

came closest to fruition in 1970 with the United Nations Education
and Social Council Convention on Illicit Movement of Art Treasures. 459 Under the terms of the convention, each signatory state must
designate cultural property of importance for archaeology, prehistory,
history, literature, art or science which belongs to one of eleven
categories. 46 0 Essentially, each country is permitted to establish its
own system of regulatory controls in such a manner as to permit the
export of cultural property only when authorized by the state and
accompanied by an export certificate. In addition, a state may classify
cultural objects as ineligible for exportation. Finally, the Convention

"I, UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import,
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 10 INT'L LEGAL
MATEMALs 289 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Convention]. See generally Rogers, supra note 262, at
948.
110 Designated cultural property must belong to one of the following categories:
(a) rare collections and specimens of fauna, flora, minerals and anatomy, and objects
of palaeontological interest:
(b) property relating to history, including the history of science and technology and
military and social history, to the life of national leaders, thinkers, scientists and
artists and to events of national importance;
(c) products of archaeological excavations (including regular and clandestine) or of
archaeological discoveries;
(d) elements of artistic or historical monurrients or archaeological sites which have
been dismembered;
(e) antiquities more than one hundred years old, such as inscriptions, coins, and
engraved seals;
(f) objects of ethnological interest;
(g) property of artistic interest, such as:
(i) pictures, paintings and drawings produced entirely by hand on any support
and in any material (excluding industrial designs and manufactured articles decorated by hand);
(ii) original works of statutory art and sculpture in any material;
(iii) original engravings, prints and lithographs;
(iv) original artistic assemblages and montages in any material;
(h) rare manuscripts and incunabula, old books, documents and publications of
special interest (historical, artistic, scientific, literary, etc.) singly or in collections;
(i) postage, revenue and similar stamps, singly or in collections;
(j) archives, including sound, photographic and cinematographic archives;
(k) articles of furniture more than one hundred years old and old musical instruments.
Convention, supra note 459, at art. 1.

564

[Vol. 12:506

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

contains a provision which would permit concerted international
action in the event that a nation's cultural patrimony is threatened
with destruction. 46 1 Action would likely be in the form of bilateral
and multilateral 46 2 agreements as to import and export controls.

In the area of bilateral agreements directed toward the control of
illicit art traffic, the United States and Mexico have entered into a
treaty designed to deter illegal excavation of antiquities and theft as
well as to promote legitimate cultural exchange. 4

3

The Mexico

Treaty protects pre-Columbian artifacts, religious art, colonial objects, and important archival documents pre-dating 1920. Under the
agreement, either party may request the other to institute the legal
property reproceedings necessary to effect the return of cultural
46 4
moved subsequent to the effective date of the treaty.

In 1972, the United States took unilateral action to stem the
expanding illicit trade in Latin American antiquities. The Pre-Columbian Act

46 5

applies to any stone carving or mural executed as a monu-

ment or as part of an architectural structure by a pre-Columbian
Indian culture. Under the provisions of the Act, art objects designated
on a list promulgated under the auspices of the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Secretary of State may not be imported into the
United States without a certificate issued by the source country certifying that such objects have not been illegally exported. Items on the
list which arrive in this country without a certificate are forfeited to
the government for return to the country of origin.468
Experience has demonstrated that unilateral action by art-source
countries is ineffective to control the illicit traffic in stolen antiquities. 46 7 Similarly, bilateral agreements tailored to fit the needs of the
461 Id.

at art. 1.
16,See generally Comment, supra note 264, at 1191-93; Note, supra note 270, at 462: Note,
supra note 277, at 105-14.
463 In 1976, the General Assembly of the Organization of the American States adopted a
convention on the protection of the archaeological, historic, and artistic heritage of the American
nations. Under this Convention, each of the signatory states agreed to identify and safeguard its
cultural property; act to prevent unlawful removal, exportation, and importation of cultural
property; and to promote the appreciation of the art of other cultures through legitimate art
exchange. 15 INT'L LEGAL MATRMALS 1350 (1976). See generally Rogers, supra note 262, at 942;
Note, supra note 270, at 474-75; Note, supra note 277, at 116-17.
4 Treaty of Cooperation Between the United States of America and The United Mexican
States Providing for the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical and Cultural
Properties, July 17, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 494, T.I.A.S. No. 7-88.
"' See generally Rogers, supra note 262, at 939; Comment, supra note 264, at 1193-94; Note,
supra note 277, at 114-16; Note, supra note 270, at 469-70.
466 Regulation of Importation of Pre-Columbian Monumental or Architectural Sculpture or
Murals (Pre-Columbian Act), 19 U.S.C. §§ 2091-2095 (Supp. 1973).
4" See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 262, at 935; Comment, supra note 264, at 1204; Note, supra
note 270, at 473; Note, supra note 277, at 128.
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signatories do nothing to halt the flow of ancient art to the markets of
non-participatory nations.46 8 Although international cooperation is
still in its infancy, multilateral legal action appears to be the best
solution to the problem of preserving national cultural property. In
order to facilitate global agreement, however, art-rich countries must
indicate a willingness to abandon overly-restrictive antiquities laws to
the extent necessary to provide incentive to art-importing nations to
assist with enforcement. It is simply unrealistic to expect "culturally
hungry, financially wealthy nations. . . [to] cooperate in enforcing a
scheme that does not permit, in some measure, the free international
In short, while the looting of archaeological
movement of art."416
sites is unlikely to grind to a total halt in the immediate future,
international action geared toward the promotion of the legitimate
exchange of art objects would serve to decrease the illicit trade in
cultural property.
Significantly, the recent developments in public international
law do not appear to offer any protection to marine antiquities. Legal
commentators appear to share the view that none of the international
conventions have demonstrated an intent to include non-living resources such as sunken wrecks and their cargoes. 470 Similarly, the
skeletal nature of national laws contributes to the uncertainty of the
status of marine archaeology.
This state of affairs is clearly the product of the lack of "accord
among nations as to the extent to which any of them may excercise
sovereignty over the sea." 47' While it appears that no nation has
sovereignty over the high seas and that coastal nations have some
rights in adjacent territorial waters, the extent of control is undetermined. 472 Traditionally, the territorial sea was delimited by the three
mile limit-the equivalent of one marine league.4 73 In 1956, a United
Nations Commission suggested that territorial limits be extended up to
a twelve mile maximum.4 4 Significantly, however, there has been
no agreement as to the appropriate distance by the maritime na-

168See, e.g., Nowell, supra note 290, at 110; Rogers, supra note 262, at 969.
410 Rogers, supra note 262, at 969.
470 H. MILLt, supra note 331, at 21-25; Altes, supra note 330, at 81; see Kenny & Hrusoff,
supra note 332, at 399.
4" Kenny & Hrusoff, supra note 332, at 399.
472 Id.
1 Id. ("this rule is based on the medieval estimate of the effective range of a cannon mounted
on shore; and in this age of increasing nationalism and better artillery, nations have begun
claiming broader territorial seas").
474

Id.
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tions. 475 Thus, the United States continues to adhere to the three mile
476
limit while other nations claim much greater control.
Nevertheless, the Convention on the Continental Shelf permits a
coastal nation to exercise sovereignty over the continental shelf, beyond the three mile limit, for purposes of exploration and exploitation
of natural resources. 477 Since the continental shelf "may extend as far
as two hundred miles," it is conceivable that a coastal47country could
attempt to enforce a claim of ownership on this basis.
Proposals for the protection of marine antiquities emphasize the
need for a uniform law "encompassing territorial waters, the contiguous zone, and the high seas." 479 One such system 48 0 would grant
coastal countries the authority to issue licenses to archaeologists for the
purpose of excavating res nullius wrecks. Where ownership rights are
uncertain, however, the coastal nation would apply to the owner's
country of residence for permission to proceed with the excavation or
declare a divestment of ownership. 481 Upon the expiration of a specified time period, divestment would occur automatically. 482 In situations where unique or valuable artifacts are recovered from a wreck,
the country of origin would be allowed to claim a percentage of its
cultural property. 48 3 The site of each country's proportionate share
would be dependent upon the location of the wreck in territorial
48 4
waters, the contiguous zone, the continental shelf, or the high seas.
The same proposal recommends giving an award to chance discoverers of shipwrecks. 485 Presumably, such an award would discourage
clandestine diving operations and provide incentive for private parties
to notify the coastal government of the existence of their discoveries.
The necessity of international cooperation and a uniform approach to the protection of marine antiquities appears to be justified
by the unfortunate results produced by the institution of strict antiquities laws by many art-source nations. 486 In an effort to safeguard
their "cultural and archaeological heritage from unskilled excavation,
475 E.g., H. MILLER, supra, note 331, at 17.
478 See H. MILLER, supra note 331, at 14; Kenny & Hrusoff, supra note 332, at 399.
477 E.g., Altes, supra note 330, at 79-80.
478 See H. MiT.Tm, supra note 331, at 17; Kenny & Hrusoff, supra note 332, at 401. But see
Altes, supra note 330, at 81.
47 Altes, supra note 330, at 81.
480 Id.
48L Id.

482 Id.
483 Id. at 94-95.

48 See id. at 95.
485 Id.

488 See id.
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illicit removal, and to enhance their economic and educational interests," the latter nations have enacted legislation governing the issuance of permits for excavation; declaration and disposition of funds;
penalties for noncompliance; and confiscation. 487 Nevertheless, unilateral action has proven itself ineffective "to halt [the] illicit trade in
cultural property in the face of flourishing international art markets." 488 In addition, tight controls often have a detrimental impact
on archaeology. 489 "Foreign archaeologists frequently find it difficult
to obtain permission to explore and excavate archaeological sites in the
face of restrictive national policies, compounded by strained international reactions when art-importing nations do not cooperate fully
with art exporting nations to stop illicit trade in art and historical
objects." 40 When applied to marine antiquities, however, tight national controls also encourage "the expansion of national jurisdiction"
by the art-source countries.
CONCLUSION

From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that there are no simple
solutions to problems of illegality in the art market. On the national
level, uniform legislation resembling the strict enforcement measures
which have been proposed in New York appear to offer the best
solution at the present time. Despite its status as one of the world's
largest art markets, however, New York has not adopted this remedial
legislation to the fullest extent possible. A similar inertia characterizes
international regulation of the art market. Although it is intellectually
possible to comprehend the inability of nations to reach an accord as
to the protection and legitimate exchange of antiquities, the repercussions are far more serious than problems of consumer protection. The
despoilation of archaeological sites around the world gives rise to the
destruction of mankind's history and precipitates a reputation of apathy for which our century will be remembered by future generations.
Lee Ann Houseman
'

, See H. MILLER, supra note 331, at 32.
Id.

488

489 Id.

49

Id.

